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Social scientists in the modernization school argue that industrialization and 
modernization lead societies to be “open” societies characterized by equal opportunities 
and a central importance of individual efforts and achievements in social mobility. They 
assume, using nation-states as the unit of analysis, that stratification takes place primarily 
and exclusively within nations. This study, by contrast, perceives stratification and social 
mobility as processes taking place globally. Shifting its focus from national dimensions 
to global and transnational dimensions, this study investigates the global social mobility 
of South Koreans, including Korean immigrants in the United States.  
This study situates income earnings and social mobility of non-migrant South 
Koreans and Korean immigrants in the United States within broader patterns of 
transnational and global social mobility, and reassesses the relative weight of categorical 
attributes (e.g. country) with that of human capitals (e.g. college education). The results 
suggest that how social stratification, despite the modernization of South Korea and the 
United States, remains shaped by categorical inequalities. In this sense, achievement and 
ascription, as criteria of selection, continue to be fundamental to global stratification. The 
role of achievement is far more modest than usually assumed when compared to the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Modernization and the roles of achievement: The traditional understanding 
“No industrial societies can be viewed as closed or static” (Lipset and Bendix 
1959:11). As Lipset and Bendix posited earlier, the majority of social scientists have 
believed that industrial societies are distinctively open societies. Western industrial 
societies have been characterized by a “modernization” package of political democracy, 
low-income inequality, and achievement-based social mobility (Lipset and Bendix 1959; 
Blau and Duncan 1967). The mainstream development sociologists and economists (the 
modernization school, particularly) claim that such modern institutional arrangements led 
to the economic growth of those Western industrial countries, and vice versa (Kuznets 
1955). And they argue that there is commonly found among modern societies a strong 
association between individual achievements and social status, while the diminishing 
association between them. Many following empirical studies supported this hypothesis. 
They (e.g., Treiman 1970) commonly found that, in industrial countries, industrialization 
created many higher-status jobs that required higher education so that education played a 
greater role in social mobility than family background or other ascribed characteristics. 
Scholars in the modernization school tend to see the transformation into a (Western-style) 
modern society as a universal pattern that every society would eventually go through in 
the process of economic growth (e.g., Rostow 1959).  
 
International migration and the changing roles of human capital 
Much of social mobility literature has paid attention to people in wealthy 
industrialized nations in the West. Developing countries have often been mentioned, but 
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it was usually for highlighting “modern” characteristics of the wealthy nations by 
contrasting them to “traditional” elements of Third-World countries. The roles of human 
capital in stratification have been understood in this dichotomous scheme: more 
important in modern societies and less important in traditional ones.  Meanwhile, despite 
a considerable volume of international migrants and resultant racial/ethnic minorities in 
countries of destination, the roles of human capital for migrants/minorities have not been 
placed on the center in stratification and social mobility research. What follows is an 
anecdote I experienced that raises some questions about the role of human capital for 
migrant/minority workers.  
Shayan is my Pakistani friend. When I first met him in Seoul, South Korea, in 
1997, he was an undocumented worker. He was working as an outdoor laborer of a steel 
company. He was a full-time worker, yet his hourly wage was much less than that of 
Korean part-time workers. My roommate, who was my college colleague as well as a 
part-time worker of the same company, brought the Pakistani friend to our home as 
another roommate. I was surprised that he claimed that he had an MBA degree from the 
National University of Singapore. Moreover, his father was an executive member of a 
bank in Pakistan. Nonetheless, he moved to South Korea as an undocumented worker. 
When I told him that he was being discriminated by the managers of the steel company, 
he said “I know that. But even though I got paid less than other Korean co-workers, it is 
still big money in my home country.” He wanted to save enough money to start his own 
carpet business.  
 Feeling his case was unfair, my roommate and I suggested that he open a small 
English class for college students. We thought that teaching English would be a better 
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way to utilize his human capital as well as for earning much more money. We had no 
doubt about his qualification for teaching English, considering his fluent English-
speaking skills and the MBA degree granted from a prestigious institute. We posted an 
advertisement throughout our college and began open registration for students. Finally, 
twelve students gathered in a classroom. However, the first meeting became the last 
meeting. Ten students cancelled their registration after seeing that the instructor was a 
Pakistani. Some of the students secretly told me, “It is a problem that he is neither white 
nor American. We want to learn from a real American or Caucasian person. His English 
is not good to learn. He probably speaks Pakistani English that is not recognized as first-
class English in the world stage.” My Pakistani friend was so frustrated and went back to 
physical labor at an apartment construction site.  
 The Pakistani worker achieved significant human capital during his life. He had a 
master’s degree from a prestigious university and his English was fluent. Yet, these 
human capitals did not matter at all in South Korea. The only thing that mattered was his 
nationality and skin color. He attempted to utilize his skills in South Korea to acquire a 
better job, but his skin-color and/or his nationality became a big obstacle. He was 
disqualified from teaching English due to his skin color and national origin. His skin 
color and national origin were qualified only in so-called 3D (dangerous, difficult, and 
dirty) industries where Koreans were reluctant to work. In the 3D industries, his high-
skills were no longer counted. In the steel company, for instance, they hired him just for 
his physical ability to do manual labor and treated him accordingly, no matter what 
degree he had. His wage level was determined not based on skill level, but based on his 
categorical status as an undocumented foreign worker from a poor country. His race and 
4 
 
nationality mattered more than whatever he had achieved. He could hardly overcome the 
legacies of being born in Pakistan.  
 This story deviates from the mainstream stratification theory (i.e., modernization 
theory) – that is, “in modern societies, one’s social status is associated more with his or 
her effort and achievement, but less with ascription. Further, this is a universal pattern” 
(e.g., Blau and Duncan 1967; Lipset and Bendix 1959). From the view of some people, 
the case of the Pakistani worker does not necessarily mean that the traditional 
modernization perspective is wrong. They may argue that South Korea has not been fully 
modernized enough to embrace foreign workers into its meritocratic system. They may 
believe that if South Korea, like the United States and other immigrant-receiving 
countries, gives up nationalist policies such as prohibiting permanent immigrations of 
foreign workers, foreign workers such as the Pakistani workers would be rewarded for his 
human capital.  
 Further, if the United States is a country known as an open society, then does the 
meritocratic system apply universally to all people in the United States? Significant 
numbers of South Koreans ride on international airplanes toward the United States every 
year, especially since the pass of the 1965 immigrant act abrogating the national origin-
based quota system. Annually, about 30,000 Koreans immigrated to the United States 
during the 1970s. The majority of these immigrants were college-educated, white-collar, 
and middle-class people in South Korea (Yoon 1997:5). They immigrated to this new 
country, hoping to achieve upward social mobility, with the American Dream promising 
the possibility of prosperity and success “according to ability and achievement regardless 
of social class or circumstances of birth” (Adams 1938). What they faced after arrival 
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were limited opportunities. Cultural and linguistic unfamiliarity, non-transferability of 
human capital from the country of origin to the new country (Chiswick and Miller 2009), 
and prejudice and discrimination against immigrants and racial minorities (Chou and 
Feagin 2008), all contributed to their difficulties in finding white-collar and professional 
employment in the U.S. labor market. Most that was available to the immigrant workers 
were jobs at the bottom (characterized by low-skilled, low-paying, and dead-end jobs) 
(Light and Bonacich 1988; Min 1984, 1996). This portrait was not only true in scholarly 
discussions, but it was also true in typical stories often reported in the mass media about 
Korean immigrants to the United States. Some college-educated Korean immigrants with 
middle-class backgrounds (such as bank clerks or owners of private education institutes 
or hakwon) migrated to the United States and began their new lives at the bottom as less-
skilled working-class workers (such as poultry workers), and after some years, opened 
their own laundries, grocery stores, or liquor shop. It seems that the purportedly most 
advanced modern nation, which was supposed to provide universal and equal 
opportunities to everyone, provided limited opportunities to Korean immigrants (Yoon 
1997:251-252). 
 
Stratification as a global process: Notes on the unit of analysis 
 The cases of social mobility practices of international migrant workers bespeak   
that the processes of stratification and social mobility are global in character 
(Korzeniwicz and Moran 2009). The global processes of stratification and social mobility, 
however, have little been researched because of the industrialization/ modernization 
school’s methodology that has been a paradigm in that field. The traditional methodology 
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has taken stratification and social mobility is processes that take place within a discrete 
and independent nation. Such national frameworks, however, have been criticized. 
Collins (2003:16) argued that “place-bound analytical categories impede our 
comprehension of emerging global processes.” By contrast, a global perspective, in 
methods, brings global processes into an analysis on stratification and social mobility.  In 
this perspective, international migration is also understood as a product of global process 
- or a global labor supply system (Burawoy 1976). Global systems shape peoples’ 
rational calculations and decision-making on international migration. Without 
considerations of global systems including global opportunity structure, stratification and 
social mobility involving international migration is not fully understandable. Thus, it is 
methodologically important to situate stratification and social mobility of individuals 
within broader patterns of transnational and global social mobility.   
 
Research questions 
Employing a global stratification perspective, this study aims to illustrate how 
social selection mechanisms look differently when seen in a global perspective. The 
study particularly focuses on how different the relative weight of achievement and 
ascriptions are in a global analytical frame. Is the conventional argument of the within-
country approach (that is, in industrial societies, one’s status is determined mostly by 
achievement) still valid in a global perspective? Otherwise, are there some ascribed 
characteristics that emerge as an important criterion scale, but were invisible in the 
national analytical frame? And, what is the most determining attribute in one’s status on a 
global scale? These questions would help us discuss on how the roles of human capital 
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(as a criterion through which returns are distributed to various populations) are shaped in 
transnational and global contexts.  
 
South Korean international migrants in the United States: The subject  
Ideally, all sending and receiving countries and migrants between them should be 
analyzed to find a general pattern in global stratification. However, this seems to be 
beyond the scope of a single project by a single author. Instead, I have selected Korean 
immigrants to the United States as the subject of the project. This group is informative to 
the research questions (i.e., whether and how the stratification mechanisms addressed by 
the within-nation perspective of the modernization school can be described differently in 
a global perspective, and whether the stratification at a global level is more achievement-
based in the contemporary modern world) in two ways. First, South Koreans have 
experienced rapid industrialization and at the same time followed the income inequality 
pattern predicted by the modernization school (i.e., the Kuznets’ inverted-U curve). 
Besides, human capital (especially education) has received an increasing importance in 
the “modern” South Korean society. During the industrializing period, the Korean 
government believed that, with the lack of natural resources, education was the key for 
the successful industrialization and exerted expansion of basic education to everyone in 
the country. South Koreans observed a considerable role of education for social mobility. 
As a result, according to Statistics Korea and the Center for Education Statistics, while 
only 6.6 percent of South Korean adults (aged 20 years old or older) attended college in 
1970,  as of 2010, more than four out of 10 adults (43.2%) in South Korean have college 
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education1 (The Korea Times, 10.29.2012). On the other hand, South Korea’s rapid 
development brought rapid changes in industrial structures. The combination of the 
dynamic development of the South Korean economy and its population’s immediate 
educational response to demand for labor provides a good context for examining how 
human capital is being constructed and reconstructed in the processes of creative 
destruction of world systems.  
Second, South Korean immigrants to the United States provide a case of 
migration between two modern societies (between the wealthiest nation and a little bit 
less wealthy, but not poor, nation). It is not difficult to expect that the relative income 
gain of international migration (to the United States) is very high for people from Haiti 
and Nepal. However, migration between South Korea and the United States is not easily 
predictable. The South Korean economy rapidly grew so much that the middle class was 
expanded and their income also has much improved over the last four decades. The 
richest 10 percent of South Koreans may be better off than the bottom 60 percent of 
Americans. Thus, it is hard to expect how much South Korean migrants experience 
upward or downward income mobility attributable to the location premium of the United 
States. This research also examines who gains from the migration and who are 
disadvantaged, which reveals what is a more important social criterion through which 
opportunities and resources are distributed to populations on a transnational and global 
scale.     
 
                                                     
1 This rate of college education includes all types of college includes two-year colleges; it 




Organization of following chapters 
In the following chapter, I discuss a national frame of the modernization and its 
problems and elaborate on a global perspective as an alternative approach to stratification 
and social mobility. I also introduce three paths to social mobility at a global level. 
Chapter 3 evaluates three paths to social mobility based on the effect of each path on 
global income positions of South Koreans. In this chapter, I also examine the global 
income position of South Koreans and Korean immigrants in the United States, by 
placing their income in a map of global income deciles distribution. Knowing the global 
positions makes possible comparative assessments of the three paths to social mobility. 
Chapter 4 investigates the social mobility of Korean immigrants at a transnational level, 
and I compare it with the social mobility of South Koreans remaining in their home 
country. Particularly, I examine the relative weight of human capital to that of the country 
of residence on the income status.  Chapter 5 is about stratification and social mobility of 
migrant minorities in the country of destination. Especially, I focus on the inequality and 
social mobility among Korean Americans, and investigate the roles of human capitals and 
categorical attributes (race/ethnicity, gender, citizenship, and nationality) among Korean 
Americans compared to those among non-Hispanic whites in the U.S. labor market. In 
this study, I argue that the effects of human capitals revolve around categorical 




Chapter 2: Theoretical Background 
 
2.1. Stratification in the Modernization perspective 
Scholars in the modernization school tend to believe that industrialized wealthy 
nations are more equal and inclusive than developing countries, characterizing these 
societies with democracy, low inequality, and porous class structure with achievement-
based social mobility. They believe that these modern societies are less likely to exclude 
people based on ascribed characteristics such as race/ethnicity, gender, or class, 
compared to developing or poor countries so-called traditional societies. These societies, 
through industrialization and modernization, experienced an expansion of education and 
an enhancement of social welfare. As a result, people have equal opportunities to access 
resources and achievements play a central role in an individual’s social mobility. 
Consequently, the association between one’s social origin and eventual destination 
diminishes.  
Treiman (1970:221) described this as the “transition from particularistic to the 
universalistic bases of achievement.” Citizenship is a good example of a universalistic 
institution. The original meaning of citizenship in society lies in its universality: 
“Citizenship shifted from a restrictive definition of membership that categorically 
excluded major classes of people, including non-whites, women, and those without 
property, to one that was ostensibly inclusive… ” (Glenn 2002:236).2  The modernization 
school believes that the establishment of inclusive institutional arrangements is a 
                                                     
2 This citation does not show her main position. Glenn does not see citizenship as 
inclusive. What she argues is that citizenship is inclusive in principle, but exclusive in 




universal and unidirectional pattern among countries experiencing industrialization and 
modernization in their developmental process. In Social Mobility in Industrial Societies, 
Lipset and Bendix (1959) argue that all of the industrialized countries they studied went 
through a similar pattern of a diminishing association of ascribed status with one’s final 
status. In his famous work, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto, Rostow (1959) identified five developmental stages (i.e., the traditional 
society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of 
high mass-consumption) as the universal path to be followed by all countries. According 
to this perspective, the eventual ending point of the development of all countries would 
be the modern society characterized by the central importance of achievement. Moran 
summarizes the characteristics of the modernization paradigm as follows: 
 
“Crucial to the modernization paradigm, and underlying the literature on 
social mobility from the start, is the claim that modernity transforms the 
process through which individuals are allocated within the division of 
labor. This transition is seen as singular, linear, and national in scope. … 
A more complex division of labor (e.g., as accompanying industrialization) 
requires a shift away from ascription and toward performance and 




Problems of the modernization perspective 
12 
 
During the latter half of the twentieth century, many countries in the world 
underwent decolonization, independence and industrialization. Contradicting some of the 
core tenets proposed by modernization theory, however, the late industrializers have not 
become more meritocratic nor have they experienced a reduction of inequality. Within-
country income inequality continues to be high (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009), and in 
some cases, it has increased (Alderson and Nielsen 2002; Bluestone and Harrison 1990; 
Levy and Murnane 1992; Nielsen and Alderson 1997). In Latin America, for example, 
access to education or other resources is still limited to exclusive groups sharing similar 
ascribed statuses (De Ferranti et al. 2004). Even within wealthy nations, some groups are 
excluded from participating in the meritocracy. The U.S., for instance, still faces 
considerable disparities not only between the rich and the poor, but also between whites 
and other racial/ethnic minorities, between men and women, and between citizens and 
non-citizens, immigrants and the native born (for various examples, see Andersen and 
Collins 2009). The official poverty rate has remained stubbornly at the same high level 
despite decades of economic growth. In particular, poverty is especially high among 
racial/ethnic minority and female householders (Iceland 2003). The modernization 
paradigm discounts or downplays theories that inequality and poverty among racial 
minorities reflects a structural or institutional problem embedded in modern societies like 
the United States. This paradigm, as (Wacquant 2007:17) points out, “construe[s] poverty 
as a mere residue of past inequalities and backwardness or as the product of individual 
deficiencies liable to remedy – at any rate, as a phenomenon bound to recede and 
disappear with the full ‘modernization’ of the country.”  The modernization school 
applies this perspective, in the same manner, to poor countries and construes their 
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poverty as the product of deficiencies of the individual countries and so as remediable by 
the full modernization of the country  (e.g., Inkeles and Holsinger 1974; Inkeles 1983).   
 The modernization perspective is the logical offspring of studies that adopt the 
traditional unit of analysis. In the mid-20th century, when the modernization paradigm 
was established, many studies disproportionately paid attention to the white male 
population. For instance, Blau and Duncan’s (1967) survey sampled full-time employed 
male workers only: It excluded women and part-time and unemployed workers. Given 
that these groups are overrepresented by black and Hispanic Americans, Blau and 
Duncan’s thesis (i.e., increasing importance of achievement) may be applicable only to a 
small segment of population (white middle-class male workers) (Brym and Lie 2006:234-
235).  
More serious is that the modernization perspective presupposes that “inequality 
results from variation at the individual level.” (Tilly 1999:31, Italics added).3 Status 
attainment model and human-capital theory, for example, “radically individualized the 
mobility process while obscuring such causes as changes in hiring practices and the 
formation of job-finding networks by migrants” (Tilly 1999:32-33). What are crucial to 
these approaches (status attainment model and human-capital theory) are individual 
characteristics such as family background and human capital. They treat these individual 
characteristics as independent from their categorical status. That is, they assume that the 
                                                     
3  According to Tilly (1999:29), “classical economists and sociologists [such as Adam 
Smith and Karl Marx] generally analyzed categories and relations among them. They 
examined returns to these factors [labor, capital, land, etc.] considered collectively and 
situated socially rather than returns to individual effort (Tilly 1999:29, [ ] added).” 
However, “by the middle of twentieth century, social scientists had almost completely 
switched their gaze from intergroup distributions to interindividual distributions” 




effects of these variables are not affected by the categorical status of individuals. Due to 
the individual-level approach, the status attainment model and human-capital theory rule 
out (unequal) relations between categorically bounded populations from possible 
independent causes of inequality (Tilly 1999:33).4  
Critical sociologists have identified enduring inequalities in which race and/or 
gender have played a significant role (see Andersen and Collins 2009, for various 
examples). Racial and/or gender minorities are on average less paid, less employed, and 
underrepresented in higher-ranked occupations when compared with equally qualified 
white male workers. Higginbotham and Andersen (2005:174) note, “With an education, 
some segments of the population could advance from working-class origins to middle-
class status, especially as access to education and white-collar jobs increased for White 
Americans. But race continues to affect career paths, as well as the educational 
opportunities required to become upwardly mobile (Italics added).”  
The persistent importance of race and gender in social mobility challenges the 
claim of the United States as an open society or the society of meritocracy. Meritocracy is, 
unlike the belief of the modernization, not universal, but limited only to some segments 
                                                     
4  The following quotation illustrates how the individualized approach of the 
modernization paradigm shapes research: “Noticing that school performances of children 
correlate with the social positions of their parents, researchers attribute those differences 
in performance to “family background” rather than considering that teachers and school 
officials may shape those performances by their own categorical responses to parental 
school positions”(Tilly 1999:30). This tradition of individualistic approaches (correlating 
occupational status with family background and education) prevails in the labor market 
research as well. Stinchcombe argues, “This tradition has however given a very queer 
tone to the mobility literature, since it deliberately starts off by talking as if people 
promoted themselves instead of being promoted by employers…” (Stinchcombe 1978a:1 





of the population. Moreover, the meritocracy was not established independently, but at 
the cost of the underdevelopment of meritocracy for categorical minorities. That is, in 
such interrelated circumstance, while there may be meritocratic systems that enhance the 
roles of achieved human capital among white male workers, the very systems contribute 
to diminish the importance of achievement among categorical minorities. Thus, a 
comprehensive understanding of stratification should include categorical minorities and 
relations between the majority and the minorities and between the minorities.  
Another problem of the traditional modernization paradigm lies in its nation-
bounded approach. Due to this boundary, this paradigm often fails to account for outside-
nation opportunity structures.  The modernization school understands stratification as the 
processes of social selection taking place primarily and exclusively within national 
boundaries, and takes nation states as a natural unit of analysis (Korzeniewicz and Moran 
2009; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003).5 However, in the real world, social mobility 
strategies increasingly involve cross-national movements for better opportunities outside 
the country (see Kaye 2010, for numerous examples). The Pakistani worker (in the 
chapter 1) turned his eyes to South Korea for better income opportunities. Likewise, a 
significant number of South Korean emigrants already looked ahead into future economic 
opportunities in the United States before the migration. At the same time, the 
                                                     
5 This approach is often called “methodological nationalism” (see Beck and Sznaider 
2006; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003; Martin and Beittel 1998; Levitt and Jaworsky 
2007). According to Beck and Sznaider (2006:3), it has the following taken-for-granted 
premises: “it equates societies with nation-state societies and sees states and their 
governments as the primary focus of social scientific analysis. It assumes that humanity is 
naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which organize themselves internally 
as nation-states and externally set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other 
nation-states … believing that social action occurs primarily within and only secondarily 
across, these divisions …” 
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international migrants (as we saw in the cases of the Pakistani worker in South Korea and 
South Koreans in the United States) often experience the devaluation of their human 
capital in new (more industrialized) societies. Thus social mobility among international 
migrants can be portrayed as upward mobility economically and downward mobility in 
terms of occupational prestige. This portrayal implies that migrant workers often sacrifice 
occupational prestige for higher wages in the richer destination. This location premium, 
however, is not visible in within-nation approaches.  
Finally, the modernization perspective treats the roles of education and other 
human capital as an independent variable to explain labor-market outcomes.  However, as 
argued by Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009:103), “the human capital criteria that underpin 
inequality are themselves an outcome of institutional arrangements linked to 
Schumpeterian processes of creative destruction.” That is, the roles of human capital keep 
changing in the processes of creative destruction (‘creative destruction’ will be discussed 
below). Some skills and human capitals are perceived as valuable high skill in one time 
or in a society, but the same skills and human capitals are not treated as the same way in 
other time or in other societies. For example, call-center jobs are deskilling in the United 
States and outsourced to other countries, especially India. This call-center job is a desired 
high-skill job in India. There are many institutes that train people who want to work at 
call-centers. Taking the roles of human capital as an outcome leads us to reframe our 




2.2. Creative Destruction and Enduring Categorical Inequality 
The Modernization perspective was influenced by an evolutionary theory that was 
born in the early nineteenth century. The evolutionary perspective assumes that “social 
change is unidirectional, progressive (the latter phase is better than the former), and 
evolutionary (not revolutionary)” (So 1990:19). For modernization theorists, the modern 
industrialized country was the model to aspire to. The way to catch up to the wealth of 
the First World countries was to follow or imitate the process that these countries had 
gone through. They assume that other developing countries want to become the rich 
world and there are no other ways than the ways that the rich world went through 
(unidirectional). It is a slow and gradual process because the transition from primitive or 
traditional society to a complex, modern society sometimes takes centuries to complete. 
Revolution is not effective in transition to a modern society (evolutionary). 
 The evolutionary assumptions of the modernization perspective – unidirectional, 
progressive, and evolutionary – have been challenged by institutionalists and political 
economists. From their perspectives, economic and social changes (including growth and 
distributional outcomes) are neither unidirectional nor progressive but contingent and 
dependent upon institutions (North 1990;Polanyi 1944/2001). Institutions in capitalist 
systems, contrasting to the perspectives of  Rostow (1959) and Fukuyama (1992) who 
claimed “the end of history,” do not progress to a certain final destination.  Schumpeter 
(1942/1994) depicts capitalism as incessantly transformative through creative destruction; 




“Capitalism... is by nature a form or method of economic change and not 
only never is but never can be stationary. ... The fundamental impulse that 
sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new 
consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the 
new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist 
enterprise creates. ... The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, 
and the organizational development from the craft shop and factory to 
such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial 
mutation – if we may use that biological term – that incessantly 
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying 
the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative 
Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism 




Creative destruction – “incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” 
– is the processes to create new sources of profit, responding to changing political, 
economic, and technological constraints. World history reveals such processes of creative 
destruction – from slavery to serfdom and from Fordism to post-Fordism, for instance.  
This institutional transformation entails selectivity: in newly “emerging” institutional 
arrays, some segments of the population would become newly selected in accessing to 
resources and opportunities, while others would be excluded from such access to those. 
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The transformation from agricultural to industrial society, for example, gave rise to 
unequal outcomes between the landowning aristocracy and the bourgeoisie.    
 Through creative destruction, the definitions of “high” skill and “low” skill also 
continue to change. Figure 2.1 stylizes the changing concepts of “high” and “low” skills 
through creative destruction. The x-axis has both time and space dimensions: each of A B 
C refers to a different country and/or a different phase in one country. Suppose that A is 
an agricultural phase or society, B is an industrial phase or society, and C is a post-
industrial phase or society. Through processes of creative destruction, a single country 
can be transformed from the phase A to B and to C. This has been an exceptional case in 
the world history. Only a few countries such as South Korea went through such 
transformation over the last century. According to this transformation of the industrial 
structure, “high” skills in the phase A may be re-categorized as “low” skills in the B or 
the C stages. In South Korea, for instance, the high-school graduates in the era of light 
labor-intensive manufacturing (between the 1960s and the early 1970s) were able to work 
as a supervisor or a manager. In that period, they were less likely to be considered 
uneducated or unskilled. Since the 1990s, the South Korean industrial structure has 
changed into the knowledge- and technology-intensive industries (such as semiconductor 
or information and communication-based industries). This transformation devaluated the 
high-school graduates as low-skilled workers.  
The creative destruction processes have a spatial dimension as well. At present, 
there coexist agricultural societies (A), industrial societies (B), and post-industrial 
societies (C) in the world. If the Korean high-school graduates moved to A (e.g., 
agricultural) society in Africa, they would be counted as high-skilled. On the other hand, 
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if the Korean college graduates migrated to the United States, some of them would be 
considered low-skilled. That is, the skills of individuals can be differently valued 
depending on which country they live. However, in contrast to global stratification, the 
national framework (in the left) tend to treat the categories of the “high” and “low” skill 
as more fixed.   
 




 Although capitalism has entailed numerous changes in the institutional array, 
ironically, categorical inequalities have not changed much (Tilly 1999; Massey 2007). 
Gender and racial inequalities have persisted in the United States even after economic 
restructuring (Massey 2007). There had been a significant improvement in occupations 
and wage among female workers since the 1970s, but such “gender revolution” halted in 
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the mid-1990s (Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011). Racial minorities experienced 
upward social mobility for a while during the post-WWII manufacturing era. However, 
African Americans became the largest victims from the economic restructuring because it 
entailed the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs that had served as a steppingstone (Wilson 
1996).  As we have seen, the beneficiary and victims of the processes of creative 
destruction are likely to be selected by the already constructed hierarchies (based on 
unequal resources) between groups categorically bounded through ascribed 
characteristics. As much as hierarchies between categories are durable, categorical 
inequality – that is, unequal distributions of rights to access to resources and 
opportunities according to categorical hierarchies – are “durable”(Tilly 1999), in spite of 
incessantly changing social systems.6     
Unequal relations across categorical boundaries formed two systems of 
stratification that in turn reinforce the unequal relations. They are exploitation and 
opportunity hoarding.7  Massey (2007:6) summarizes these two mechanisms in Tilly’s 
(1999:86-95) work:  
 
                                                     
6 The argument that categorical inequalities are durable does not mean that categorical 
hierarchies do not change at all. The transformation from feudal to capitalist systems did 
not benefit the old landed aristocracy (the existing power group). However, such 
fundamental and revolutionary changes have not been rare over the long history. Most of 
creative destruction incessantly occurs in capitalist systems because it is the capitalist 
mechanism. It would be interesting to see whether or how creative destruction would 
change the existing hierarchies among categorical groups in the long run.  
 
7 According to Tilly (1999:95-98), these two basic stratification mechanisms are 
reinforced by two other social processes: emulation and adaptation. These two 
mechanisms, by reproducing and keeping the existing systems of categorical inequality, 
contribute to institutionalize categorical distinctions and the existing unequal relations 
such as exploitation and opportunity hoarding.   
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“Exploitation occurs when people in one social group expropriate a 
resource produced by members of another social group and prevent them 
from realizing the full value of their effort in producing it. Opportunity 
hoarding occurs when one social group restricts access to a scarce 
resource, either through outright denial or by exercising monopoly control 
that requires out-group members to pay rent in return for access. Either 




Exploitation and opportunity hoarding were originally key concepts of Karl Marx 
(exploitation) and Max Weber (opportunity hoarding). In addition to those more critical 
sociologists, Adam Smith also acknowledged, even earlier, these two mechanisms 
(although he did not use the terms, exploitation or opportunity hoarding) embedded in 
unequal relations between town and countryside (Smith 2000).   Adam Smith illustrated 
that corporation systems and other related-systems were established, by the town 
residents, to provide more benefits to the town residents:  
 
“Corporations were established to keep up prices and consequently wages 
and profits; by means of which the towns gained at the expense of the 
country, in exchange for the produce of a smaller quantity of their own as 
the exports of a town are the real price of its imports. Combination is easy 
to the inhabitants of a town, and difficult to those of the country, who are 
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Town and countryside are (unequally) related to each other economically. Town or urban 
areas usually take a role in producing high value added goods, while rural areas produce 
low value added raw materials or crops. Such value added is in fact determined by an 
unequal relationship between two regions. Smith (2000:142) argued that “it is to prevent 
this reduction of price, and consequently of wages and profit, by restraining that free 
competition which would most certainly occasion it, that all corporations, and the greater 
part of corporation laws, have been established.”(Italics added). Thus, trades between 
two regions are likely to favor town residents. And, the results of such trades, combined 
with town-favored institutional arrangements, reinforce the existing regional income gap.  
The unequal benefit is not only found in trade, but also found in labor. The 
countryside not only serves as a provider of food or raw materials, but it also serves as a 
source of cheap labor. The substantial income gaps motivate rural people to move to 
urban sectors. Those internal migrants usually find their jobs on the bottom of the ladder. 
This is easily justified by urban residents who attribute this to rural people’s lack of 
urban-relevant skills. If the migrant workers increase their skill level or more skillful 
workers come as a result of more frequent connections to the town, competition in the 
town would become severe. In this case, one of two strategies is usually adopted by urban 
residents to protect themselves from such increasing competition. First, they raise the 
minimum requirements, and, second, they make the skills of the migrant workers 
obsolete (destruction) by creating new industries and changing the institutional 
24 
 
arrangement (creation). This unequal relationship maintains (and justifies, in the name of 
comparative advantage) the unequal division of labor within a society.   
Racial inequality also has some similar creative-destruction mechanisms. When 
rights to access to the formerly white-only public schools were granted to all African 
Americans after the end of the Jim Crow era, the public schools began to be devalued, 
because middle-class whites started sending their children to private schools (Collins 
2010: 47-48). The consequence of this change (privatization) is that private schools 
became more valuable, while the existing system (public school) became obsolete 
simultaneously. We can infer that privatization was created – intended or not – to restrain 
African Americans who gained rights to access to public schools and other public 
services, from accessing to a good-quality of education and other services.  
 
2.3. Global Stratification Perspective 
This study places international migration at the center for understanding the 
mechanisms of global stratification and global social mobility. Neoclassical economic 
theory assumes that international migration is an individual-level rational choice on the 
basis of cost-benefit considerations. In this theory, it is international wage differentials 
that are most important in the considerations at a global level, given its assumption that 
“an individual moves when the reward paid to labor is higher in the destination country.” 
(Yarbrough and Yarbrough 2003:9). A world-systems perspective also considers 
international wage gaps a key cause of international migration. However, the interests 




First, in the world-systems approaches, rational calculations are regarded as 
bounded to situations and systems.  
 
“In contrast to the neoclassical economics concept of the rational, utility-
maximizing migrant, world-system approaches to international migration 
focus on the structures that condition and constrain individual action. 
Migration is part of a system: individuals may indeed migrate on the basis 
of cost-benefit considerations, but both the costs and benefits of 
movement are structured by an historical context of unequal exchange in a 
hierarchical international division of labor.”(Sanderson 2012:463) 
 
 
Second, the main focuses of world-systems approaches are different from those of 
neoclassical economics. While the conventional neoclassical approach considers 
international income gaps “exogenous,” a world-systems approach perceives cross-
country wage differentials themselves to be explained in a historical context. Therefore, 
while the neoclassical economic perspective regards wage gaps between countries as an 
explanatory variable of international migration, a world-systems perspective focuses 
more on the global structures and processes and their historical contexts that generate 
international wage differentials and their historical contexts (Sanderson 2012:463-464). 
Having this in mind, I focus on structural factors or systems that make their 
migration rational, rather than individual-level motivations. When we try to understand 
global processes of social selection through social mobility of international migrants, it is 
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a necessary first step to understanding the systems that produce international migration 
and make it a rational or irrational strategy for social mobility. This work requires 
understandings on relations between sending and receiving countries. From the within-
country perspective, sending countries are relatively poor and often described as with 
words like exclusion, ascription, and categorical inequality, while receiving countries are 
richer and characterized with words such as inclusive, universal opportunity, and the 
possibility of success through individual achievement. When we focus only on wealthy 
nations, their institutional arrangements may appear inclusive and achievement-based. In 
these countries, success is construed as the outcome of individual effort and achievement.  
When shifting our focus from individual wealthy nations to relations between 
countries, however, we can find the very institutional arrangement (appearing to be 
inclusive) of wealthy nations is built on the institutional arrangement that excludes the 
population categorized outsides from access to resources and opportunities 
(Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009:81).  
 
Global exploitation  
We have discussed on how unequal relations between town and countryside 
benefit the town residents. Globally, we can see similar imbalances in economic and 
political power between countries.  The town-country gap and their unequal relationship 
appear globally in the form of the First World (town) versus the Third World (country) or 
North (town) versus South (country). For a long time, going back to the seventeenth 
century according to Wallerstein (2004), the Third World or the South (or periphery) 
countries have taken the role of providing raw materials and agricultural products, while 
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the First World (core) countries have taken the role of producing highly valued 
commodities 8 (Again, the value or price of the commodities itself was constructed by 
capitals in the First World), on the basis of the “comparative advantage” principle.  
“Comparative advantage” is actually the concept that was asserted by the First World 
countries to maintain and justify the international division of labor, which confined 
developing Third World countries into providers of raw materials and cheap labor as well 
as buyers of expensive high-value-added goods (Chang 2002). In this situation, the 
education and skills of the elite class in developing countries are likely to be considered 
“high-educated” or “high-skilled” only within the developing societies; the same 
education and skills can be considered “less-educated” or “unskilled” when located in 
developed societies. Through this process, the labor of workers in the developing 
countries is “justifiably” devalued, while the labor of workers in the developed countries 
gets highly valued. 
Since the WWII, however, there have been changes in this “division of labor” as 
some newly industrialized countries (NICs) like South Korea and Taiwan emerged. NICs 
came to have capacity to produce manufacturing goods. Besides, the labor was much 
cheaper (and skillful) in those areas compared to the already industrialized wealthy 
countries. The capitalist class in the wealthy nations faced increasing price competition 
from the capitalists in NICs. Keeping manufacturing plants in the country of expensive 
labor was not profitable any more. Capitals began to displace the plants to NICs of 
abundant cheap and skillful labor. As capitals moved to other less-developed and cheap-
labor countries, the earlier industrialized countries like the United States have 
                                                     
8 The international division of labor is well demonstrated with ample evidence by 
scholars who study global commodity/value chains (see Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1993).   
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transformed their economic structure since the 1970s. This post-industrial economic 
restructuring was characterized by the so-called ‘hour-glass economy’ depicting the 
expansion of the high-tech, knowledge-based industries at the top and the expansion of 
low-skilled service sectors at the bottom but the decline in manufacturing jobs in the 
middle (Sassen 2001; Waldinger 1999). When understanding capitalism as a process of 
Schumpeterian creative destruction, we can infer that, as the First World capitals shift its 
main industries from manufacturing to high-tech/ knowledge/information-based 
industries, the former (manufacturing) is devalued as obsolete while the latter (high-
tech/knowledge/information-based industries) is highly valued as a new source of profit.  
 
Global opportunity hoarding 
According to Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009:78), the wealthy nations’ 
institutional arrangements entailing low income inequality (to protect their own citizen 
workers) 9 serves, simultaneously, to reproduce the high level of between-country income 
inequality.  
  
“Selective exclusion, in the case of within-country LIE [Low-inequality 
equilibria] , operates fundamentally through the very existence of national 
borders, reducing competitive pressures within those borders, while 
simultaneously enhancing competitive pressures among the excluded 
                                                     
9 The United States, which is characterized by the high rate of racial inequalities, is an 
exception from this low-income inequality pattern of the wealthy nations (mostly 
Western European countries). Thus, Korzeniewicz and Moran characterize the United 
States as “hybridity”: “the historical trajectory of the United States suggests a mix of 




population outside the very same borders (again, in the arenas or markets 
to which those populations are restricted). Hence, the establishment of 
within-country LIE and the persistence of between-country HIE [High-
inequality equilibria] are not two separate processes: rather, they are the 
outcome of the fundamental institutional arrangements undergirding world 
inequality”([   ] added) 
 
 Between-country income inequality has been kept high by wealthy nations’ 
institutional arrangement that protects their own population within categorical boundaries. 
But for any restriction, supposedly, free migration between poorer (labor-abundant) to 
richer (labor-short) countries would contribute to reduce income inequality between the 
countries as the supply of labor becomes close to the equilibrium of demand and supply. 
It was the case in the nineteenth century when the first great globalization boomed and no 
restriction in crossing national borders was implemented. According to O’Rourke and 
Williamson (1999), mass international migration between Europe and America drove 
falling income inequality between the two continents between 1850 and 1914.  
The tendency of the convergence in income between countries, however, did not 
last long. In America, the influx of immigrant workers enhanced competition among the 
low-wage working class and contributed to restrain a rise in the wage of native-born 
working-class workers. The relative slowdown in the growth of the working-class wage, 
compared with the wage growth of the middle-class, resulted in a rising within-country 
inequality.  This rising income gap in the United States led to the backlash of native 
(white) workers against immigrant workers. As a response to the backlash, the U.S. 
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government closed the door on immigration to protect the native workers. Restrictive 
immigration policies contributed to a declining inequality within the United States, but 
they slowed the convergence between America and Europe to a halt. According to 
O’Rourke and Williamson (1999:5), “convergence stopped between 1914 and 1950 
because of de-globalization and the retreat to autarky.” 
  What we learn from this history is that the pattern of between-country inequality 
is contingent on the political economic situation of wealthy nations. When they restrict 
immigration to protect their own valuable people (i.e., native white workers) from 
competition, the fierce competition shifts to people outside the boundary of the own 
people (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999; Williamson 2005; Glenn 2002; Usdansky and 
Espenshade 2001). Put differently, while the wealthy nation’s inclusive and protective 
institutional arrangements are applied to certain citizens only, the same institutional 
arrangements simultaneously serves as an exclusion of people outside countries and 
outsiders (categorical minorities) within countries.  
 
2.4. Three Paths to Global Social Mobility 
To understand such relations that make international migration as rational for 
social mobility, it is necessary to take the notion of global social mobility. Studying 
social mobility in a global perspective becomes more important as outside-country 
opportunities are increasingly considered among people as a realistic alternative. 
Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009) conceptualize three paths to global-level social mobility: 
within-country, between-country, and jumping categorical inequality (put differently, 
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global social mobility through international migration)10. Figure 2.2, stylizes three paths 
to social mobility drawn from a global perspective. 
 
 





Path 1: Within-country mobility 
The first path is within-country mobility. In this path, social mobility is measured 
by a shift of the position of individuals relative to those of others living in the same 
                                                     
10 The global social mobility is conceptually different from the between-country mobility. 
While the between-country mobility refers to a country-level mobility, the global social 




nation. The social status of outsiders is disregarded. Thus, in the framework of within-
country mobility, people in the richest 10 percent within Haiti can be considered as the 
“rich”, “elite”, or upper class, no matter where they might be positioned when compared 
with the populations of other countries. Likewise, the poorest 10 percent of Americans 
would be considered “very poor”, even if their income would place them in the top 10 
percent in Haiti.  
It is this perspective on social mobility that has dominated stratification research 
traditionally. When the modernization school or industrialists emphasize the importance 
of achievement in industrial societies or the importance of ascription in “traditional” 
societies, they are referencing an individual’s or group’s position within the country and 
ignoring global hierarchies. In this framework, they argue that industrialization provides 
more opportunities for upward mobility – especially in urban areas. This promotes social 
mobility through rural-to-urban migration for a while. After this transition period, once 
the society is industrialized and urbanized, the roles of human capitals become more 
important in accessing to resources and opportunities (Kuznets 1955).  
Thus, in industrial societies, human capital – particularly education – has drawn 
the most attention and its role in social mobility has been recognized as an indicator of an 
open society.  Human-capital theory emphasizes that the highly educated earn more 
because education increases productivity, which allows those individuals to demand 
higher wages (Becker 1964/1994). This argument is criticized by social scientists that 
focus on institutions. Collins (1979) argues that the highly educated get paid higher due 
not to their higher productivity but to social institutions that screen workers by 
educational credentials. Others focus on the labor market structure, such as the dual labor 
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market (Doeringer and Piore 1971) or labor market segmentation (Gordon, Edwards, and 
Reich 1982). This perspective does not deny the importance of education either, in the 
sense that the highly educated are likely to find jobs in the primary sector which gives 
higher rewards. Education is still important even for critical scholars who emphasize 
class background or socioeconomic status. Those scholars see education as an institution 
reproducing the existing class system: education plays the role of mediating and 
transferring the family’s economic resources into human capital, which contributes to 
justify the higher income of the existing rich class (Bowles and Gintis 1976). As 
addressed above, not all within-country approaches advocate the human capital theory; 
many scholars emphasize the importance of structural and institutional contexts such as 
social systems or labor-market structure. However, they do not deny the role of education, 
because it is mostly the highly-educated who benefit from such structural/institutional 
configurations.  
 
Path 2: Between-country mobility 
 The second path is between-country mobility. This path is concerned with the 
income standing of each country in the world hierarchy. Such studies rank each country 
using a measure of economic productivity or income, like GDP Per Capita. As everyone 
in a country is assigned the same income (i.e., the average national income of a country) 
in the analysis, differences among individuals are mostly ignored and the position of 
people refers only to the rank of the country. 
In the between-country mobility perspective, national economic growth is the 
most important path to social mobility. There are debates among development scholars 
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on what are keys for national economic development. The modernization school 
emphasizes industrialization and modernization as a panacea of development. Thus, 
industrialization and modernization contribute the economic growth of developing 
countries, which would result in upward mobility of the developing countries (e.g., 
(Firebaugh 2003). By contrast, the dependent and world-system schools highlight 
persistent or rising income inequalities between rich/core and poor/(semi)periphery 
countries due to the unequal relationship between countries (e.g., Arrighi and Drangel 
1986; Korzeniewicz and Moran 1997).  
Because the focus is on national, not individual, incomes, mobility is a national 
outcome reflecting national actions. The performance of businesses in trade or the state’s 
industrial policy to enhance competitive power in the world economy, for instance, are 
considered crucial (Amsden 1992; Chang 2004). Consistent with emphasizing national 
actions, this path is less associated with choices made by individuals. Yet, this does not 
mean that the between-country mobility is not a concern for individuals. As 
Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009:107) note, “when people in South Korea and China 
endorse policies designed to generate economic growth, rather than abandoning their 
concern for inequality, they are recognizing the potential significance of such a path for 
engaging in upward social mobility within a global system of stratification”(Italics in 
original). This reasoning has been empirically found when South Korean government 
policy appealed to nationalism for implementing its neoliberal policy. The South Korean 
government has often justified an increasing income gap across classes caused by its 
neoliberal policy as the cost of economic upward mobility of the country in the world, 
claiming that the ascent eventually would lift up all people in the country (Shin 2006). 
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The promising future of national economic development as seen in the case of 
South Korea is not universally applicable. Scholars adopting dependency and world-
system approach agree that “such a road of national economic growth has not been easily 
accessible to vast parts of the world, and success stories have been the exception rather 
than the rule for most of the world’s population”(Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009:107). 
Even for people in a country that is experiencing success like South Korea, the between-
country income mobility seems less tangible because people may not be able to enjoy the 
benefit of national economic growth in their time as it takes several decades at least to see 
the effects.  
 
Path 3: Global social mobility (through international migration)  
The third path is mobility through international migration, which is called 
“jumping categorical inequality” by Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009). This path becomes 
visible when we have a global perspective that embraces the world community and 
understands social mobility as a shift among all people in the world. Unlike the between-
country mobility focusing only on the positions of countries, the global perspective is 
concerned with every individual. In this perspective, it is no longer assumed that every 
Chinese individual receives the same income (represented by national accounts such as 
average GDP per capita). The global perspective ranks Chinese individuals based on their 
own income, not their national income. Thus, the rich Chinese can be found with other 




The global perspective allows us to find social mobility practices that do not make 
sense within the national framework. I focus on international migration, among others. 
According to Black, Natali, and Skinner (2006), international migration is indeed driven 
by the pursuit of global social mobility of people who are situated in global inequality: 
 
“International migration is a powerful symbol of global inequality, 
whether in terms of wages, labor market opportunities, or lifestyles. 
Millions of workers and their families move each year across borders and 
across continents, seeking to reduce what they see as the gap between their 
own position and that of people in other, wealthier, places. In turn, there is 
a growing consensus in the development field that migration represents an 
important livelihood diversification strategy for many in the world’s 
poorest nations”(Black, Natali, and Skinner 2006: 1). 
 
Studying international migrants is advantageous in that international migration 
uncovers the dynamic aspect of social mobility taking place across unequally related 
countries.  Let’s take an example of Filipino nurses’ migrating to the United States (Choy 
2003). Nursing is not such a high-paying occupation within the Philippines, while it is a 
very promising occupation for those who plan to migrate to the United States or other 
rich countries. For the Filipino nurses who migrated to the United States, their returns to 
education bear much higher than for most other occupations in the Philippines. In 
studying the nurses’ returns to education among Filipinos, if we examine nurses working 
within the Philippines only, we would hardly understand why so many Filipino women 
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choose nursing. In many cases, nursing is chosen because it facilitates entry into and 
employment in the United States and other rich countries (Choy 2003).  
Unfortunately, international migrants are often forced to change occupations 
when crossing borders. In fact, significant portions of immigrant workers experience a 
change in occupation after migration. International migration to wealthier countries 
usually involves occupational downgrades. A significant portion of Korean immigrants 
who had middle-class backgrounds with professional occupations in the country of 
origin, become working-class service workers or small shop owners in the United States. 
In these cases, international migration accompanies a tradeoff between income advantage 
and occupational disadvantage. Their occupational prestige is more likely to lower, but 
their absolute wage would be increased and possibly higher than the wage they were 
supposed to receive in the country of origin.  
Bringing international migration to social mobility research, the role of human 
capital becomes more complicated. In the case of Filipino nurses, while nursing may not 
offer much to the college-educated in the Philippines, the reward is likely to be 
substantially higher in America. This implies some interaction between human capital 
and categorical status. That is, when their nursing education at a college (human capital) 
meets the American labor market (categorical location), their education possibly receives 
a higher return than they would have received in the Philippines. The role of human 
capital is more complex for migrants who experienced occupational downgrading.  
Despite its growth, international migration has not been researched enough in 
terms of its effect on the social mobility of migrants. Even though there are some social 
mobility studies focusing on international migrants, these studies are limited to the 
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within-country perspective. The majority of the immigration literature examines the 
upward/downward mobility of immigrants within countries of destination, mainly 
comparing their standings when they first immigrated to a certain destination with their 
standings after then (e.g., Akresh 2008; Borjas 2006). There is rare a study comparing the 
income standings of migrants to people either of the world or the country of origin. 
Following chapters explore the effects of each of the three paths for South Koreans 
(chapter 3) and investigate what constitute the main determinants of the income positions 
of South Koreans and Korean Americans at a global/transnational level (chapter 4) and in 
a destination context (chapter 5). 
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Chapter 3. Three Paths to Global Social Mobility: A Historical Assessment  
 
3.1. A Within-country Mobility 
3.1.1. Income Inequality in South Korea 
 During the industrialization period (the 1960s to the early 1990s), South Korea’s 
income inequality trend followed Kuznets’ inverted U-curve, except for a decline for a  
short period in the late 1960s: Income inequality increased from 1970 (.332) and reached 
to peak in 1976 (Ku 2006:12);  then, it gradually declined until the occurrence of the 
1997-98 South Korean economic crisis (Ku 2006:20). This declining trend stopped in 
1998 when the South Korean government accepted the neo-liberal structural adjustment 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to receive a relief loan. The structural 
adjustment dramatically transformed the society, particularly labor-market institutions to 
be more flexible. As a result, unemployment and under-employment rapidly increased. 
This change accounts of considerable part of the increased income inequality in South 
Korea after 1998. 
 






































































The Gini coefficient measure has a limitation that it does not show whose income 
has changed more. Percentile income distributions are more informative in this inquiry.  
Like the Gini coefficient trend, the P80/P20 percentile ratio of household income shows a 
declining pattern from 1982 to the mid-1990s and an increase thereafter (Ku 2006:24-25).  
 
Data and Method 
My calculations of income decile ratios using the Urban Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (UHIES) (1983 - 2002) from the Korean National Statistical Office 
(KNSO) also display similar patterns. KNSO began this nationwide household survey in 
1963 for households whose head is 15 years old or older. The surveys from 1983 to 2002 
sampled urban households that have at least two household members only. The surveys 
excluded households in rural areas, single-person households, and foreign households 
from samples. Only the households of the working population were surveyed in this 
dataset and self-employed households were excluded.11 Meanwhile, the data for the 
period 1983-1999 list office-worker households and non-office worker households 
separately, but they have been combined since 2000. 
Although the surveys sampled for individual households, the dataset used in this 
study has grouped (income-decile level) information as the basic unit of data such as an 
average income and average household size of each income decile. For the analyses of 
                                                     
11 Due to the narrowly-focused sampling, the target samples are only 37.4% of the total 
households. Therefore, there is an issue regarding representativeness. To improve the 
representativeness of the samples, the survey began to include the samples of non-urban 
households and households of the self-employed in 2003. The survey included single-
person households from 2006 (Ku 2006:153).   
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the ratio of per-capita household income, I calculated per-capita household income of 
each decile, using its average total monthly household income (in Korean Won) and 
average household size: I divided each decile’s average household income by the average 
number of household members of the corresponding decile; To make the monthly income 
to an annual income, I multiplied the per-capita income by 12; finally, I converted the 
income into U.S. dollar income by dividing it by the exchange rate of each corresponding 
year. 12 Table 3.1 reports the average of per-capita household income by income deciles. 
 
Table 3.1. Average Per-capita Household Income by Income Decile in 
South Korea, 1983-2002 (Unit: US current dollars) 
 Non-office worker's household  Office worker's household  Total 
 1983 1988 1993 1998  1983 1988 1993 1998  2002 
D1 804 1632 5007 4182  1103 3114 6688 5614  6116 
D2 1022 2133 6872 5403  1503 3008 8998 7921  8255 
D3 1212 2615 6073 6769  1784 3516 8326 9721  10611 
D4 1413 2920 7153 6159  2077 4321 8741 8108  12019 
D5 1595 3266 7855 6970  1886 4711 10403 8908  14283 
D6 1825 3742 9052 7662  2730 5037 11377 10317  11868 
D7 1675 4326 9936 9013  2316 5916 12501 11340  13726 
D8 1973 4944 11175 10275  2665 6702 13947 12327  16296 
D9 2411 6020 13352 12329  3416 6455 16609 14340  19171 
D10 3850 7794 19921 19556  4640 9787 23652 22851  29143 
Source of data: Urban Household Income and Expenditure survey, Korea 




D1 refers to the bottom ten percent in total per-capita household income, and D10 
means the top ten percent. Figure 3.2 illustrates the D10/D1 per-capita household income 
                                                     
12 For this conversion, I used World Bank data for the foreign exchange rates of each year 
(www.worldbank.org). This conversion into U.S. dollar may provide non-Korean readers 
a better sense of the income level of South Korean households so that the readers may 
easily compare it with the income of households in other countries.  
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ratio, or the relative incomes of the two extreme income groups. It is interesting that 
income changes have occurred to a larger extent among non-office workers’ households 
than among the households of office workers. This suggests that non-office workers’ 
households have been more affected by the industrial changes. Total household income 
ratios (2000-2002) appear around 5. That is, during that period, the per-capita household 
income of the top ten percent is about 5 times higher than that of the bottom ten percent. 
This is similar to the ratios of non-office workers’ households. Noteworthy is that the 
ratio began rising in 1998 for the office workers’ households, while such rising already 
began in the early 1990s for the non-office workers’ households. We may infer that non-
office workers already began to be vulnerable to the neo-liberal transformation of the 
South Korean policies in 1993 while the office workers were not affected by that until the 
1997-98 economic crisis. 
 





















Source of data: Urban household income and expenditure survey, KNSO, 1983-2002 
 
 
D10/D1 ratios overall support the income inequality trend measured by Gini coefficient – 
that is, “great U-turn” of post 1998.  This D10/D1 ratio analysis, however, does not 
provide a clear answer whether the ratio changes are due to the changes in the top ten 












Figure 3.3. D10/N (National Average) and N/D1 Household Income 
Ratios among Non-office Workers and Total, South Korea 
N/D1 (Non-office Worker) 









Figure 3.4. D10/N (National Average) and N/D1 Household Income 
Ratios among Office Workers, South Korea 
D10/N (Office Worker) 
N/D1 (Office Worker) 
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understanding of whose income changes are more responsible, I calculated the income 
ratio of the top ten to the national average per-capita income, and the ratio of the bottom 
ten to the national average.  
 Figure 3.3 displays the relative income change of D10 and D1 to the national 
average income (N) among households of non-office workers (1983-1999) and total 
workers (2000-2002). N/D1 ratio had been around 2.5 for the period from 1983 to 1988, 
but it dramatically fell to lower than 2. D10/N, by contrast, had remained around 1.8-1.9 
until 1991. This means that the bottom ten percent made a significant achievement to 
catch up to the national average since 1988. Thus, we can infer that the low income 
inequality during the late 1980s and the early 1990s was driven by the upgrading of the 
bottom income groups. This coincides with the time of the massive strike of labor unions 
in 1988 that had noticeable success in increasing workers’ wages. Another noticeable 
trend is that the income of the top decile grew faster than the national average after 1992. 
This may be attributable to the significantly transformed, more flexible labor-market 
policy that came as a condition of South Korea being a member of OECD. Among office 
workers’ households, as figure 3.4 shows, the trend of income disparity during the 1990s 
was driven more by the income growth of the highest incomes, rather than by that of the 
lowest income group.  
 
3.1.2. Social Mobility within South Korea 
Internal migration 
Internal migration, especially rural to urban migration, is a common strategy for 
social mobility among industrializing countries (Kuznets 1955). South Korea was not an 
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exception. During the industrialization period, internal migration from rural to urban 
areas in search of jobs occurred massively and rapidly (Lie 1998).The results of the 
internal migration vary by individual households: Some achieve rapid upward mobility, 
while others become part of a marginal class in urban areas. The individual-level analysis 
has been rarely available due to the absence of such longitudinal data tracing individual 
migrant households. Instead, we can estimate, through examining the rural-urban income 
gap, how effective the rural-to-urban migration could be in South Korea. 
Table 3.2 shows the ratio of farm household income to urban worker’s household 
income. In 1963, right before the start of industrialization, the income of farm households 
was higher than that of urban worker’s households. After 1965, right after the state 
initiated its five-year economic development plan, the farm economy fell behind the 
development of the urban sector. The considerably large rural-urban income gap 
promoted a massive internal migration to urban areas. During the 1960s and 1970s, South 
Korea experienced one of the most rapid exoduses in world history (Koo 1990; Lie 
1998).  
The next two decades (1975 to 1995) is characterized by parity between rural and 
urban incomes. Two factors contributed to this parity. The first factor is the growth of the 
rural income. The state began its rural development project in the mid-1970s which 
included improving rural environments, distributing new agricultural technology, and 
industrializing rural areas. The second factor is the relatively slow growth in urban sector, 
which was partly caused by growing urban poverty (a consequence of the rapid and 
massive internal migration) and also the retarded growth of workers’ wages (due to the 
state’s repressive labor policy). After the peak of 1985, especially since the mid-1990s, 
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the relative income of farm households to urban ones has rapidly decreased. The ratio of 
farm to urban household incomes was 97 % in 1990, but drastically declined to 81% in 
2000, and to 73% in 2002. This may be partly due to rapid aging of rural population as a 
consequence of the massive exodus of young working-age adults. With respect to the 
effectiveness of the internal migration strategy, the small rural-urban income gap (except 
for the 2000s) and completed urbanization imply that the effect of the internal migration 
would be limited in social mobility.  
 
Table 3.2. Ratio of farm household income to urban worker's household income  
(Unit: Korean 1,000 won) 
  1963 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 
Urban  4,729 8,248 7,427 9,997 12,278 19,519 26,853 28,643 31,464 
  (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) 
Farm  6,130 6,239 8,243 9,584 13,849 19,013 25,530 23,072 22,981 
  (1.30) (0.76) (1.11) (0.96) (1.13) (0.97) (0.95) (0.81) (0.73) 




Scholarship on South Korean stratification paid particular attention to the role of 
education in social mobility (e.g., Chang 2009; Park 2003; Phang 2004). Especially 
during the 1980s, the late period of industrialization, education was one of the most 
important qualifications to upward social mobility in South Korean society (see Yeo 
2008:59). This period seems to support the modernization perspective (e.g., Blau and 
Duncan 1967) that considers an achievement-based ‘open’ society as a fruit of 
industrialization. Recent studies, however, show different findings from those in 1980s. 
Focusing on the effect of family socioeconomic background on an individual’s economic 
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status, recent research claims that education is still important to an individual’s status and 
social mobility, yet the level of education is itself increasingly dependent on a family’s 
socioeconomic status (Chang 2000; Yeo 2008) or father’s education (Cho 2004). 
According to these studies, since the 1990s, education has served as an institution to 
transfer class advantages intergenerationally, thereby reproducing rather than changing 
the existing class hierarchy (Yeo 2008; Cho 2004). Regardless of whether education is a 
result of individual effort or of family background, the determining role of education in 
social status in South Korea has been seldom disputed. 
The trend of income growth is similar between households of college graduates 
and those of high school graduates from 1985 to 2002 (see figure 3.5). Both groups’ 
incomes increased from 1985 to 1997; incomes sharply fell in 1998; and their incomes 
have been growing since.  
The BA/HS degree income ratio peaked in 1986, when incomes for college 
students were 1.7 times higher than for high school graduates on average. After the peak 
in 1986, it gradually declined until 1995 (when average incomes were 1.3 times higher 
for a bachelor’s degree), with some fluctuation. Then it rose again and fluctuated until 
2002. As of 2002, according to the ratio in figure 3.5, through earning a bachelor’s 
degree, a household may increase its per-capita income by about 40 percent (or about 


























Figure 3.6 Ratio of Per-capita Household Income of BA to 

























































Figure 3.5  Total Per-Capita Household Income by 
Educational Attainment in South Korea, 1985-2002 
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The role of educational attainment in social mobility is more clearly understood 
when we know its effect on wage. During industrialization in South Korea, it was certain 
that educational attainment contributed to social mobility. This mobility was generally 
associated with occupational mobility toward the industrial sector, rather than with 
income advantages in the same sector. At this time, according to Birdsall, Ross, and 
Sabot (1997:107), education brought a ‘compression’ effect. In other words, as the supply 
of the educated workers had increased to exceed the demand for them, the value of 
education decreased in South Korea. From 1976 to 1986, for example, the proportion of 
workers with a high school  degree or higher increased rapidly so that in 1985 only 8 
percent of Korean workers were minimally educated (with elementary school or less). 
Coincidental with this rise in the share of population that was highly-educated, the wage 
premium from education declined. In 1976, South Korean workers with a high school 
degree earned 47 percent more compared to those wth only a primary school education or 
less; but the wage premium for a high school degree fell to 30 percent in 1986. The wage 
premium for a tertiary education versus a primary education also declined from 97 
percent to 66 percent for the same period (Birdsall et al. 1997: 107). The return to 
education, however, has increased since the mid 1990s (Kang and Yun 2008). The 
college premium started rising in the early 1990s (See figure 3.6). It is interesting because 
it increased while the percentage of college graduates in the labor force continued to 
increase from 6.7 percent in 1980 to 12.5 percent in 1988, 17.5 percent in 1993, and up to 
23.4 percent in 1998 (You and Lee 2000:15).  
 
Skill or occupational attainment 
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 Occupational mobility, from the modernization perspective, is also a very 
important and effective path to social mobility. Industrialization provided many high-
paying occupations that had not existed before. This increased the importance of the 
attainment of industrial skills. We can figure out the social mobility effect of these 
strategies through investigation of the wage returns to occupational and skill attainment.  
Wage inequality of South Korea had persistently decreased during the 1980s and 
the first half of 1990s (Fields and Yoo 2000; Kim and Topel 1995; Kang and Yun 2008), 
but this trend was reversed after the mid-1990s. What caused the change in the trend? 
Kang and Yun (2008), using the data of the 26 waves of the Korean Occupational Wage 
Survey, 1985-2005 and a decomposition method, examined how much the wage 
inequality trend can be accounted for by the changes in the worker’s characteristics 
(characteristics effect) and how much by the changes in the returns to worker’s 
characteristics (coefficient effect). Their conclusion is that “changes in wage structure 
[i.e., changes in the returns to worker’s characteristics] substantially explain both the 
decreasing and increasing of wage inequality… the substantial changes in the distribution 
of worker’s characteristics and changes in occupational or industiral composition explain 
almost nothing” (Kang and Yun 2008:16). In other words, the change in the wage 
inequalty pattern in South Korea was not driven by an increase in the number of highly 
educated people or the number of female workers in the labor market; it was shaped by 
changes in returns to workers’ education, gender, and so on. Changes in the returns to 
worker’s characteristics are in a large part mediated by changes in returns to occupation. 
Changing returns to edcuation is an expression of changing industrial structure and 
institutional arrangements that constantly shape and reshape the meaning of “high-skill” 
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and “low-skill” (Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009) and, therefore, reconstruct a “high-
paying” occupation and “low-paying” occupation. Thus, a historical investigation is 
required to better understanding on the dynamic processes of the changing value of a 
certain skill.  
 Given the close association between occupation, (the amount and the type of) 
education and skill, a historical comparison of each occupation’s hourly wage provides a 
part of the picture of how the South Korean labor-market reward systems have changed.  
For this analysis, I use world wage data from UBS (formely the Union Bank of 
Switzerland). In 1970, UBS began a survey of prices and salaries 31 cities across the 
world and has reported the results every three years since 1971. The number of cities 
included in this survey grew so that 73 cities are included as of 2009. The popultion of 
countries where the sampled cities are located account for roughly 70% of the world’s 
population (Korzeniewicz and Albrecht 2012). The UBS survey collected information on 
wage, payroll taxes and working hours for 14 separate occupations ranging from 
construction workers to department heads. “The survey was conducted with a 
representative sample of companies, and participants’profiles were defined with 
maximum specificity with respect to marital status, work experience and education.” 
It is not easy to collect and compare wage across the world because the way of sampling 
is not standardized globally and sampling in some countries are uncertain. In this 
circumstance,  “the survey was conducted with a representative sample of companies, and 
participants’ profiles were defined with maximum specificity with respect to marital 
status, work experience and education”(UBS 2009:6). Therefore, there is a caveat that 
“figures do not represent statistical averages and its collection was limited to just a few 
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companies for each profession and city, data from different sources may differ”(UBS 
2009:26). In this analysis, I use hourly wages estimated by Korzeniewicz and Albrecht 
(2012). Using the reported gross wage data, they created an estimate of hourly wages by 
“dividing the pay per week by the average number of working hours (also reported in the 
data).”13  
The finding presents that that, in Seoul, South Korea, between-occupation hourly 
wage disparity has manifested a considerable rise from 1994 onward. These hourly wage 
trends in Seoul stand in sharp contrast to ones in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Figure 3.8). 
The overall trend of between-occupation hourly wage gaps in Buenos Aires can be 
described as a bell-shaped curve, rising from 1982 to the early 1990s and then falling, 
especially since 2000. It perhaps indicates that wage levels in Buenos Aires are less likely 
to be determined by the kind of occupation.  
Source: UBS, World Wage Data 
                                                     
13 Korzeniewicz and Albrecht’s estimation did not take into account the average vacation 
days reported by UBS because this information is less consistency (Korzeniewicz and 









































Source: UBS, World Wage Data  
Note: The lines show the average trends of wages of each occupation. 
 
  
The different wage of each occupation (or different returns to skills) are largely 
determined by institutional arrangements that allocate rewards selectively and unevenly 
across groups, depending on the preferrence of the labor market. In turn, institutional 
arrangements, as shown in the history of the Korean development, has been shaped by the 
developmental goal and industrial policies. The targeted industries of the South Korean 
government have changed according to the developmental level from raw materials 
before its industrialization (before the 1960s) and light labor-intensive manufacturing 
industries (in the late 1960s and the early 1970s) to heavy-chemical industries (in the late 
1970s) and to semiconductor industries since the 1990s (Lie 1998). When the state 
focused on the light labor-intensive manufacturing industries for export, women were 
massively recruited. This recruitment was mainly possible by the capitalists purpose to 
save labor costs. Therefore, although women were increasingly included in labor market 






































wages during that period (Kim 1997). After the 1990s, the similar mechanisms of 
inclusion/exclusion occurred to foreign workers. Foreign worekrs have been excluded 
from the benefits from South Korea’s economic development. Currently, foreign workers 
are used and exploited for the survival of small companies or Korean self-employers 
where saving labor cost is an essential to compete with others. 
 
3.2. Between-country Mobility 
3.2.1 Economic Development and National Upward Mobility 
 There is a debate on whether the world is moving toward more equality. Some 
scholars (Firebaugh 2003) argue that between-country income inequality has declined 
due mainly to the upward mobility of newly industrialized countries such as South Korea 
and China. However, this seemingly convergence is largely due to the rapid growth of the 
Chinese economy with the world’s largest population, rather than by the upgrading of 
many developing countries (Milanovic 2005). The gaps of national mean income (such as 
GDPPC) among nations have not been reduced. For the latter half of the twentieth 
century, there is a growing divergence in between-country income inequality 
(Korzeniewicz and Moran 1997; Milanovic 2005:39). As Milanovic (2005: 61) argued, 
“Western countries (that were already at the top) have pulled ahead of the rest of the 
world, and in only a few exceptional cases have non-Western countries been able to catch 
up.” In other words, between-country mobility has not been common, it was rather 
exceptional.  
 South Korea is one of the exceptional cases. South Korea’s rapid industrialization 
during the latter half of the twentieth century evidenced the effectiveness of between-
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country mobility through national economic growth on the global income standing. 
Figure 3.9 displays the trajectories of the economic growth of the selected countries and 
the world as a whole (GLB) from 1960 to 2010.While the GDP per capita (GDPPC) of 
South Korea had been considerably lower than the world average from 1960 to 1980, it 
started to surpass the world GDPPC in the middle of 1980s. Since 2000, South Korea 
achieved GDPPC more than twice as high as the world average. The rapid 
industrialization of South Korea upgraded its standing from one of the poorest countries 
before 1960 to the 13th highest GDPPC country among 197 countries in the world as of 
2010.14  
Source: World Bank, Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries. 
 
Milanovic’s (2005:61-62) mobility table of nations also illustrates the upgrading 
of South Korea in a position in the World. In the 1960s, South Korea was in the Third 
                                                     
14Source: The World Factbook, (CIA) (Retrieved from 
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-workd-factbook/geos/ks.html) 
The United States 
South Korea 


















World, defined as the countries with GDP per capita levels between one- and two-thirds 
of the poorest WENAO country (which was Portugal at that time). It’s position has 
rapidly moved up and passed by the status of “contender”15 country in 1978, and now (as 
of 2000) South Korea became one of rich countries defined (by Milanovic) as those 
whose GDP per capita is higher than the GDP per capita of the poorest WENAO country 
(which was Greece in 2000) (Milanovic 2005:61-62).  
 
3.2.2. Industrial Changes and the Roles of Human Capital 
 The between-country upward mobility of South Korea is not just a matter of 
income mobility. Upgrading of the country’s position accompanies the roles of the 
country in the world economy. That is, the economy is transformed industrially and 
institutionally: from labor-intensive to capital-intensive; from low value-added to high 
value-added industries; from using cheap labor to outsourcing.    
In 1960, South Korea was an agricultural country. About one of five workers was 
a farmer or worker in forestry and fishery (Table 3.3). After four decades, however, the 
agriculture took less than 10 percent of workers. Manufacturing (including mining) 
steadily increased between 1960 and 1990, which reflects the country’s rapid 
industrialization. The most rapid growth is found in social overhead capital (and others). 
Social overhead capital (SOC) means capitals that are not directly used for production, 
but used for social infrastructures, which covers everything from transportation and 
                                                     
15 “Contender” refers, by Milanovic, to the countries where GDP per capita is 
immediately behind the GDP per capita of the poorest WENAO country. That is, they are 
the countries where are in good position to catch up rich countries (Milanovic 2005:61) 
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power to all kinds of public services (schools, universities, hospitals, libraries, etc.).The 
percentage of SOC increased from 15 percent in 1960 to 71 percent in 2000.  
 
Table 3.3.Composition of Employed Persons by Industry: 1960-2000 (Unit:%) 
Industry 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Agricultural, forestry & 
fishery 
Mining & manufacturing 





















Source: KNSO, Social Indicators in Korea (Hong 2003:41) 
* SOC (social overhead capital) 
 
  
The development goal and industrial policies are shaped by the position of a local 
country in the world economy. The targeted industries of South Korea have changed 
according to its developmental level from raw materials before its industrialization 
(before the 1960s) and light labor-intensive manufacturing industries in the late 1960s 
and the early 1970s, to heavy-chemical in the 1970s, to semiconductor industries in the 
1990s (Lie 1998).  
 The late 1990s provided a different world-economy circumstance to South Korea 
than before. The rising global competition for exports led to a rapid decline in export 
earnings. China, India and some Southeast Asian countries emerged as competitor 
nations for exports. Their labor costs were lower than South Korea’s, which provided 
them with advantages in price competition with South Korea. Increasing labor cost, 
combined with a serious trade balance deficit, threatened chaebols and other companies 
in South Korea. Chaebols moved production overseas.  
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 After 1990, the weight of manufacturing has declined. This may be attributable to 
the outsourcing of large companies to countries whose labor is cheaper. The 1990s indeed 
experienced massive outsourcing of cheabols, or conglomerates, such as Samsung, 
Hyundai, LG, and Daewoo. By the mid-1990s, South Korea became one of the largest 
foreign investors in a number of developing and transition economies (Shin and Chang 
2003: 77-78). 
 Many manufacturing industries have been going overseas for cheaper labor, while 
many finance-related industries have grown significantly due to financial liberalization in 
1993. During the period from 1992 to 1996, the increase in employment in finance, 
insurance, real estate, and business services amounted to 30.2 percent of the total 
employment increase during the same period. This is a significant expansion from only 
18.4 percent during the period from 1988 to 1992 (You and Lee 2000:15).  
 As South Korea upgraded, the state gave up the competitive advantage of cheap 
labor. This resulted in the abandonment of policy regulating wage increases. Therefore, 
the labor market system became more flexible. Facing the increasing cost of labor, 
companies became reluctant to hire full-time regular workers. Instead, they increased the 
hiring of part-time irregular workers. About 28 percent of workers were temporary 
workers (who were employed from one month to less than a year) in 1994, while the 
percent increased to about 35 percent in 2002. Day laborers were also increased from 14 
percent to 17 percent during the same period (Kim 2004).  
 




3.3.1. International Migration of South Koreans 
At an individual level, there are broadly two ways for social mobility. The one is, 
as aforementioned in within-country mobility, investment in human capital (acquiring 
education and skill). The other one is changing their categorical group. This way is more 
attractive where categorical inequality is higher. It is, however, not easy because 
categorical characteristics such as race/ethnicity and gender are rarely changeable. 
Changing location is perhaps only an available strategy. In a within-country perspective, 
it appears as rural-to-urban migration. From a global perspective, we focus on 
international migration. The internal migration ceased to serve as an attractive social 
mobility strategy in South Korea as its population is mostly urban so that few working-
aged people remain in rural areas.  
International migration has also been extensively practiced since the 1970s and, 
unlike the internal migration, it continues. International migrants vary from students and 
guests workers to permanent emigrants. Thousands of South Korean workers migrated as 
construction workers to the Middle East in the mid-1970s and many mining and nursing 
workers moved to European countries, especially Germany (Lie 1998:88). The majority 
of Korean international migrants came to the United States (Yoon 1997; Light and 
Bonacich 1988). As figure 3.10 displays, in the recent period (2000-2005), the United 
States is the largest destination among emigrants whose purpose is to settle in a new 
country (i.e., among those whose purpose is not a temporal stay for work or study). 
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Source: Ministry of Justice, Yearbook on Departure & Arrivals, Each year (Notes: excludes 
crew), South Korea 
 
Figure 3.11 depicts the trend of annual immigrants from South Korea to the 
United States from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s. This trend looks highly correlated 
with the income gap between the country of origin and destination. There had been a 
significant national income gap between two countries until the late 1980s. During this 
period, annually 30,000-35,000 Koreans moved the base of their lives to the United 
States. However, since 1990, the volume of the migrants rapidly decreased and stayed 
low from 1992 to 1999, reporting 13,000-18,000 Korean immigrants per year.  
This trend reflects the changing economic position of South Korea in the world 
economy, and as a result the changing relations between South Korea and Korean 
immigrants in the United States. The 1990s of South Korea can be characterized as fully 
modernized in economics and politics. Particularly, the 1988 Seoul Olympics was 






























started recognizing the rapid development of their country. South Koreans came to have a 
positive image of their own country. Besides, watching the 1992 L.A. riots reported on 
TV, South Koreans began to realize what Korean immigrants were doing for living and 
how much they struggled in American society. These two events contributed to their 
changing view toward Korean immigrants from enviable to poor people (Abelmann and 
Lie 1995), which demotivated migration to the United States.  
The number of Korean migrants to the United States began to rise again since 
2000. This seems to be highly related to the economic crisis of South Korea in 1998. A 
significant number of workers have been forced to retire due to the crisis; regular job 
opportunities decreased and the rates of unemployment and under-employment increased. 
Such increasing risk perhaps propels the emigration of South Koreans. Their migration 
was also facilitated by rapidly increased cost for private education for their children 
(especially English education) (Yoon 1997). 
 














3.3.2. Positions of South Korean and Korean-American Income Deciles 
How many Korean immigrants in the United States are better off or worse 
compared to South Koreans? I compared the per capita household income of South 
Korean households with that of recent immigrant households in the United States who 
are defined as Korean immigrant households and have been in the United States less than 
five years. The reason I compare with the recent immigrants is that the income of the 
newly arrived group is likely to be associated with more immediate or direct effect of the 
migration.   
Figure 3.12 reports that, in 1980, the richest ten percent of the recent immigrant 
households earned per-capita incomes which were about 3.5 times higher than the richest 
ten percent of South Korean worker’s households, while the poorest ten percent of the 
immigrants received income which was similar as that of the poorest ten percent of South 
Korean workers. In 1990, while the income gap was still largest for the tenth (the richest) 
decile, the gap became narrower compared to the gap in 1980 (see figure 3.13).The top 
ten percent of Korean immigrant households earned per-capita incomes which were about 
$6,000 higher than that of the top ten percent of South Korean office-worker’s 
households and about $13,000 higher than that of the top ten percent of South Korean 
non-office workers households (interestingly, in South Korea, an income gap between 
office and non-office workers became wider considerably).  The income gap at the 
highest decile increased again from 1990 to 2000. As seen in figure 3.14, in 2000, the 
per-capita income of the top ten percent of Korean immigrant households is almost twice 
as that of South Korean counterparts ($60,000 and $29,000, respectively).   
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The bottom decile, by contrast, shows the opposite. The poorest 10 percent among 
the Korean new arrivals to the United States receive per-capita household income which 
is less than that of South Korean households. In 1990, the income of the poorest group of 
the immigrants is about $3,000 lower than South Korean non-office worker’s households 
and about $4,000 lower than the office worker’s households. For this poorest group, the 
income level had not been improved from 1990 to 2000. The between-group income gap 
also had maintained the similar level as the one in 1990.  
 
 Note: Korean recent immigrants refer to the samples that have been in the United States less than 
5 years. 
Source: PUMS 16 5% 1980, 1990, 2000, for Korean immigrants; Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey, Korean National Statistical Office, for South Koreans.  
 
                                                     
16 The source of these data is http://usa.ipums.org/usa , managed by the Minnesota 
population center at the University of Minnesota. Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie 
Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and Matthew Sobek. Integrated Public 
Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University 


















Figure 3.12. Per-capita Household Income of South Koreans (1983) 
and Korean Recent iImmigrants (1980) 
Korean recent immigrant Non-office worker in S.Korea Office worker in S.Korea
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 Note: Korean recent immigrants refer to the samples that have been in the United States less than 
5 years. 
Source: PUMS 5% 1980, 1990, 2000, for Korean immigrants; Household Income and 





Note: Korean recent immigrants refer to the samples that have been in the United States less than 
5 years. 
Source: PUMS 5% 1980, 1990, 2000, for Korean immigrants; Household Income and 



















Figure 3.14. Per-capita Household Income of South Koreans and 
Korean Recent Immigrants, 2000 
















Figure 3.13. Per-capita Household Income of South Koreans and 
Korean Recent Immigrants, 1990 
Korean recent immigrant Non-office worker in S.Korea Office worker in S.Korea
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The income of the recent migrants may reflect the class background of the 
migrants; on the other hand, it could be a “pure” migration effect on income (rather than 
labor-market adjustment or acculturation effects). According to immigration literature, 
international migration from Asia is more the practice of the middle class than of the 
upper class or the working or poor classes (unlike Mexican migrants whose majority is 
working class). For elites, there is usually no motivation to leave their country because 
they are able to enjoy their high status in their own country.  For the working class in 
Asia, as they have to cross the Pacific to come to the United States, international 
migration is not an easily available option for them given their lack of financial and 
informational resources necessary to make such an international migration.   
 The class background of Korean immigrants has varied by period (Yoon 1997). 
The immigrants of the 1970s-80s periods were likely to have a middle-class background 
(with high education and professional occupation). The 1990 cohort of immigrants is 
characterized by a combination of a significantly increasing number of individuals from 
working class who came to the United States as a way of family reunion and the 
declining middle-class’ immigration (due partly to increasing opportunities according to 
the rapid growth of the South Korean economy). The 2000 cohort has been more diverse 
in terms of class. The 1997-98 economic crisis threatened the middle class so that they 
considered migration to reduce risk. The different class background of each period is 
reflected in figure 3.12-14.  
 As discussed above, although Korean immigrants have come from diverse classes, 
the upper class and very poor class are expected to be underrepresented among the 
migrants whose majority would be middle or working class. Therefore, if the income of 
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the Korean recent immigrants was just a reflection of their class background in the 
country of origin, the income inequality among the immigrants should have been lower 
than that among South Koreans. Unlike our expectation, however, as figures 3.12-14 
demonstrate, income gaps between deciles are larger among recent Korean immigrants 
than among South Korean workers. It is inferred that their new country context plays 
some role in the widened income gap among the immigrants. The fact that the between-
group income gap is larger in 1980 than in 1990 is associated with the larger gap between 
the South Korean and the U.S. economy in 1980 than in 1990. Although there was a 
selective migration, it solely was not enough to account for the migrants’ much higher 
income at higher deciles than the income of South Koreans at the same deciles. It was the 
wealth of the United States and its high-paying labor market (between-country income 
inequality) that played a significant role in upgrading the income level of the migrants 
relative to non-immigrant South Koreans. 
 In 1990 and 2000, the gap between the Korean migrants and non-migrants in 
South Korea became smaller than in 1980. It seems to be due to the combination of the 
upgrading of the wealth level of the migrants and the rapid upgrading of the Korea’s 
economy. Noticeable is that, through their international migration to the United States, 
some groups (mostly, already richer) may have experienced a dramatic increase in 
income within 5 years, while others (mostly, already poorer) have not. This is another 
role that the context of the receiving country played. The United States, since the new 
immigration act of 1965, has institutionalized its evident preference system to select 
workers with “qualified skills” who would meet the changing demand for labor according 
to the economic restructuring.  
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3.4. Evaluations of the Three Paths to Global Social Mobility 
3.4.1. Global Income Decile Positions 
Data and Method 
 Which path is more effective for South Koreans’ social mobility from a global 
perspective? To evaluate the effectiveness, we should first know where each group 
(South Koreans and Korean immigrants) is positioned in global income deciles. For this 
analysis, first, the map of global income deciles distribution should be constructed. I used 
the World Income Distribution (WYD) data of the World Bank. WYD has mean per 
capita household incomes of income deciles or ventiles of each country.17 The WYD 
database is composed of national household surveys from most of the world’s countries 
from 1988 to 2002 in five-year interval (Milanovic 2005, 2009). 
  
Table 3.4. Coverage of Population and Income of the surveys (%)  
    Population   GDP (in US$) 
  1988 1993 1998 2002  1988 1993 1998 2002 
Africa  48 76.1 67.1 77  48.7 85.2 71.2 71 
Asia  92.5 94.9 94.4 96  94.4 93.2 95.6 95 
E. Europe/FSU  99.3 95.2 100 97  99.4 96.3 100 99 
LAC  87.4 91.8 93 96  90.2 92.8 95.2 95 
WENAO  92.4 94.8 96.6 99  99.3 96.2 96.3 100 
World  87.3 92.4 91.6 94  96.5 95.4 96 98 
Source: Milanovic (2005:107) for 1988-98;(Milanovic 2009:6) for 2002 
Notes: E.Eurpoe/FSU: Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union 
LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean 
WENAO: Western Europe, North America, and Oceania 
 
                                                     
17World Bank researchers collected household per capita income of every individual 
household from the household surveys. All individual household per capita incomes are 
ranked and grouped into deciles (10 income groups) of the country for 1988, 1993, and 
1998,17 and into ventiles (20 income groups) of the country for 2002. Every income 
group is assigned the group’s mean value of the household per capita incomes. 
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The coverage of this database is impressively comprehensive. The data for the year 2002, 
for example, include 120 countries’ household surveys representing 94 percent of the 
world population and 98 percent of total GDP of the world (Milanovic 2009:5). Table 3.4 
presents the coverage of the WYD data. 
For the mapping of the global income distribution, I first converted different local 
currencies of the mean incomes of each decile into comparable U.S. dollar incomes using 
the exchange rate (I will discuss issues about income converting below). The mean dollar 
incomes then were weighted by each decile’s population size. Finally I ranked and 
grouped all the converted and weighted decile incomes (ventiles for 2002) into global 
income deciles.18 Each of the global income deciles is presented with GLB, that is, 
GLB1~10, and income deciles or ventiles of each country are marked as, for example, 
USA1~10, KOR1~10, or CHN1~20.19 
 After constructing the tables of the global income deciles, I positioned the income 
deciles of Korean Americans on the global income deciles. Data for Korean American 
households has been obtained from Current Population Survey (CPS). Through this 
process, we can find to the locations of South Korean deciles and Korean American 
deciles from the view of global income standing.  
 For global comparisons of incomes, meanwhile, all local currencies should be 
converted into a common currency. Two convertors are most popular among global 
                                                     
18 Therefore, there is an unavoidable assumption that everyone in the same income decile 
is supposed to have the same household per capita income. 
 
19 WYD data desegregated Chinese household per capita incomes into ventiles (20 
income groups). This decision may be made due to the large size of population and the 
wide range of income within China that makes deciles not detail enough to present 
income distributions.  
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income inequality students: foreign exchange rate (FX) and purchasing power parity 
(PPP). FX, which converts the incomes of local currencies into dollars, gives us a 
comparison of people across the world in terms of their cross-country purchasing power. 
PPP, on the other hand, which converts the incomes of local currencies using PPP 
exchange rates that reflect the different domestic price level of each country, gives us a 
comparison of the level of domestic welfare (available consumption) (Milanovic 
2005:12). Which conversion rate is better depends on the purpose of the research at hand 
(Korzeniewicz and Moran 2007:567). Because of their nation-bounded approach, the 
majority of studies of global income inequality use PPP (Milanovic 2005:13). I, however, 
used FX to convert incomes because FX-adjusted dollar income, as commonly used in a 
global market, is a better indicator of purchasing power than PPP-adjusted income in a 
global market. That is, FX-adjusted income is more fit to this study whose interest is 




Within-country mobility  
Figure 3.15indicates the locations of the selective country deciles in the map of 
global income deciles. The range of within-country mobility varies by country. The range 
of income distribution within China has enlarged from 1988 to 2002. During this period, 
the richest 15 percent of Chinese experienced significant upward global income mobility 
by jumping up by three deciles (from GLB5 to GLB8).  However, the poorest 10 percent 
remained in the position of world’s poorest 10 percent (GLB1) during the same period. A 
wide range of within-country income distribution of China is consistent with the literature 
reporting notable increases in income inequality within China for the last two decades 
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(Fan, Kanbur, and Zhang 2009). What we know from this is that China, through its rapid 
industrialization, produced a significant portion of the middle class of the world, yet not 
everyone has benefited from its economic growth. In the context of China characterized 
by a wide distribution of income, the within-country income mobility can lead to a 
significant change in one’s global income position as well. Theoretically, the within-
country income mobility strategies such as educational attainment or migration to urban 
areas in China make it possible for Chinese people to move up from GLB1 to GLB8. 
 The within-country mobility strategies appear not that effective among South 
Koreans from the global perspective. Between 1988 and 2002, most South Koreans were 
constantly found to be between GLB8-10, or within the richest 30 percent in the world. 
This implies that within-country mobility (e.g., through higher education, internal 
migration, etc.) allows South Koreans to cross two global income deciles at most. The 
effect of the within-country mobility on the global income mobility appears to be even 
smaller for Americans. All U.S. income groups find themselves in the world’s richest 20 
percent (GLB9-GLB10) between 1998 and 2002. Thus, it can be said that previous 
stratification researches focusing on wealthy countries account only for stratification of 
the richest quarter of the world population. 
 
Between-country mobility 
 Unfortunately, it is not yet possible to see how the national economic growth of 
South Korea has affected global income mobility at a decile level due to the absence of 
data on world incomes prior to 1988. However, given the fact that 1988 already found all 
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the South Korean income deciles in the position of the upper-middle class (within the 
richest 30 percent) of the world, which is a remarkable shift from its globally lower 
income status until 1980, it is reasonable to believe that every South Korean income 
decile rose during the period of its industrialization. 
The upgrading of South Korea continued but at a slower rate between the late 
1980s and the early1990s. The period from 1988 to 1993 saw continuing economic 
growth, which raised the global standing of most of the South Korean income deciles. For 
example, in 1988, there was only one decile (KOR10) in the group of the richest 10 
percent globally (GLB10), but two deciles in 1993. The poorer South Koreans also 
experienced upward mobility in global income standing. In 1988, 40 percent of South 
Koreans (KOR1-4) belonged to GLB8, while only 10 percent remained there in 1993 and 
the other 30 percent moved up to GLB9. The 1988-1993 period supports the “growth-
with-equity” thesis of East Asian countries (World Bank 1993), exhibiting that the 
benefit of South Korean economic growth for global income mobility was widely 
distributed to all income groups. 
The next period, 1993-98, gives us the opportunity to observe the impact of the 
economic crisis of 1997 on the global income standing of South Korean income deciles. 
During this period, there were no groups that experienced global upward/downward 
mobility except for KOR9 that fell down to GLB9. That is, even though South Korea 
experienced its economic crisis in 1997, that crisis did not affect substantially the global 
income status of South Koreans. The following period, 1998-2002, demonstrates that 
there was no significant change among South Koreans in their income position at the 
global level, suggesting that the South Korean economy did not experience significant 
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mobility in the country’s income position of the world from 1998 to 2002. Given the 
stable patterns found between 1993 and 2002, one may argue that South Korea’s era of 
industrialization has already passed, so mobility through national economic growth is 
hardly expected in the future for South Koreans. 
 
Global social mobility (Jumping categorical inequality) 
 Unlike the between-country perspective that places countries on the world 
hierarchy, my global stratification perspective originally aimed to place individual 
households on the global income distribution. Ideal for the global perspective is to mark 
the locations of every household on the global income deciles. However, this study uses 
decile units, rather than individual household units because WYD data are composed of 
the decile units. To discern the effect of country on world income status, I locate Korean 
American (KAM) deciles in the map of the global income deciles. For data on Korean 
Americans, I used the Current Population Survey (CPS)20 for 1998 and 2002 (the 
identification of Korean ethnicity is not available in 1988 and 1993 CPS). According to 
figure 2, in 1998, seven deciles (representing 70 percent) of Korean Americans (KAM4-
10) belonged to the richest top ten percent of the world population, while only one decile 
of South Koreans did. The decile comparison for 1998 also exposes that KOR9 (i.e, the 
second highest income decile among South Koreans) is placed in a lower position than 
KAM4 (i.e., the fourth poorest income decile among Korean Americans) in the global 
income deciles. In 2002, 15 ventiles (75 percent) of Korean Americans appear in the 
global top ten percent (GLB10) whereas 4 ventiles (20 percent) of South Koreans were 
                                                     
20The 1998 and 2002 CPS data were retrieved from IPUMS-CPS 
(http://cps.ipums.org/cps/) (King et al. 2010).  
 74 
found there. The percent in GLB10 is seven times higher for Korean Americans than for 
South Koreans in 1998, but only 3.75 times higher in 2002. 
This result shows the significant effect of the country of residence on the global 
income standing. However, it is an over-simplification to attribute the higher income 
status of Korean Americans compared to South Koreans solely to the country effect. 
Some immigration scholars highlight the selective migration thesis: Immigrants, 
especially Asian immigrants, were not randomly selected from the population of their 
country of origin (Lobo and Salvo 1998). They are not only people who have frontier 
spirit with great enthusiasm for the American dream, but they can afford to bring with 
them human capital and enough resources to succeed in the country of destination. 
Therefore, in order to answer whether or to what extent the higher income status of 
Korean Americans can be attributed to something related to their migration to the U.S., 
incomes of the two groups should be adjusted for their demographic and socioeconomic 
status (This issue is discussed in chapter 4 in more detail) 
 
3.4.2. Skill versus Location  
 Global comparisons of wages in each city in the world shed light on the relative 
effects of skill and location on global stratification. Using UBS’s world wage data, I 
examine the wage effect of within-country occupational mobility (related to path 1 
mobility), within-occupation country mobility (related to path 2 mobility), and 
international migration (related to path 3 mobility).  
 The wage effect available by a within-country occupational mobility is measured 
by the wage gap between occupations at the bottom and at the top. There are 14 
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occupations in UBS dataset. Among these 14 occupations, I take out female occupations 
(i.e., female factory workers and female sales assistants) to control gender disadvantages. 
(In fact, both female occupations are the lowest and second lowest-paying occupations 
among 14 occupations). After removing those female occupations, I rank each of the 12 
occupations by its wage in 2009. The top occupation is “department head” and the 
bottom one is “building laborer.” “Engineer” is in the middle, which is 7th (out of the 
total 14 occupations).21   
A building laborer in Seoul, by upgrading his/her human capital, can be promoted 
ideally to a department head in the same city.  This maximized occupational migration 
would increase his/her hourly wage by about 2-3 times (or $3-5) in the early 1980s. As 
the wage of department head has grown more rapidly, as of 2009, a building laborer is 
possible to raise his/her hourly wage by more than five times (or about $21). In the case 
of engineer who represents the middle in wage status as of 2009, the occupational 
mobility to department head provides an hourly wage increase of about $14 or twice of 
their engineer wage.  
 
                                                     
21 In 2009, Department heads were defined as “Operational head of a production 
department with a staff of over 100 in a sizeable company in the metalworking industry; 
completed vocational training and many years’ experience in the field; about 40 years old 
married, two children”; Building laborers were defined as “Unskilled or semi-skilled 
laborer; about 25 years old, single” ; Engineers were defined as “Employed by an 
industrial firm in the electrical engineering sector, university or technical college 
graduate with at least 5 years’ work experience; about 35 years old, married, two 
children” (UBS 2009:26-38).  
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Source: World Wage Data, UBS 
 
  
What if the Seoul engineer migrates to New York as an engineer? Figure 3.17 
shows the wage mobility available from migration when migrant workers maintain their 
occupation. An engineer in Seoul can increase his/her hourly wage more than four times 
through migrating to New York City (from 11.98 to 40.16) in 2009. That is, for a Seoul 
engineer, migration to New York as the same engineer provides twice the wage benefit as 
upward occupational mobility to department head in Seoul. Such migration effects are 
much evident in the case of the migration from poorer countries such as India. An 
engineer in Mumbai raises an hourly wage by 21 times by moving to New York City 
(from 1.88 to 40.16). These cases demonstrate how effective and important the between-
country mobility is in a global perspective.  
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Figure 3.16. Hourly Wage of Department Head, Engineer, and 
Building Laborer in Seoul, 1982-2009 
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Source: World Wage Data, UBS 
  
In many cases, international migration accompanies occupationally downward 
mobility. It is common among Korean immigrants in the United States (Min 1996; Yoon 
1997). Even if the Seoul engineer experienced occupational downward mobility, there is 
still a wage advantage from migration. As figure 3.18 displays, as of 2009, if a former 
engineer (an occupation in the middle) in Seoul find his/her job in construction as a 
building laborer (an occupation at the bottom) in New York, he/she would earn wage that 
is twice high as the wage of an engineer in Seoul. In the case of Mumbai, even a worker 
at the top occupation (department head) hardly earns half of the wage of a building 
laborer in New York. This comparison sheds light on why many highly educated Indian 
workers work in occupations of lower status in New York.  
 
NYC Engineer  
SOL Engineer  






















Figure 3.17. Hourly Wage of Engineers in New York, Seoul, and 
Mumbai, 1979-2009 
 78 



























Figure 3.18. Hourly Wage of Selected Occupations in New York, 
Seoul, and Mumbai, 1976-2009 
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Chapter 4. Human Capital and Categorical Inequality: A Transnational level 
Being interested in the changing roles of human capital and categorical 
characteristics in different contexts, this chapter investigates the relative importance of 
human capital to location (i.e., country of residence) in transnational and global 
dimensions. Although their achievements still play a significant role, the status of 
international migrants is also vulnerable to transnational context shaped by the 
interrelationship between countries of origin and of destination. The nation-bounded 
approach of the modernization school, however, leaves little room for critical 
assessments of the impacts of stratification operating at a transnational level that may 
rearrange the roles of human capital and ascribed attributes. Thus, through investigating 
the social mobility of international migrants, we can test the thesis of modernization 
school (i.e., the central importance of human capital) at a transnational level. 
This chapter, with a transnational perspective,22 situates the incomes of South 
Koreans and Korean Americans within a broader pattern of transnational social mobility. 
Although social mobility can be defined in various ways, my primary focus lies on 
income status as an indicator of their social status because income is an indicator that can 
be compared more objectively across nations. 
In order to figure out the social mobility effect of Korean migration to the United 
States, firstly I examine the current social status of Korean Americans in the United 
                                                     
22 Observing increasing transnational migrants and other transnational activities, some 
sociologists and anthropologists claim that we should shift away from the traditional 
approach that takes nation-states as the unit of analysis, which is called methodological 
nationalism, and should take transnational or global perspective. See Levitt and Jaworsky 
(2007), Martin and Beittel (1998), and Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) for theoretical 
discussion. There are also some empirical studies using a transnational perspective (e.g., 
Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Ong 1999).  
 80 
States with a primary focus on whether Korean immigrants, compared to other racial 
groups, enjoy “just” returns to their human capital in the U.S. labor market. Secondly, I 
investigate their pre-migration social status. Although there is no nation-wide survey 
providing information on pre-migration income and occupations, there are some regional 
surveys that allow us to grasp their occupational status before migration. Unfortunately, 
pre-migration income information is not available even in these regional surveys. With 
this limitation, I measure income mobility effects indirectly by comparing the income 
status of South Koreans with that of Korean Americans. Thus, we should be aware that 
this analysis is not about the individual-level effects of international migration measured 
by differencing the individual’s income before and after migration. The findings should 
be understood as displaying the structure that limits or expand possible levels of income 
mobility. By integrating and ranking the incomes of South Koreans and Korean 
Americans in a single space, we shall figure out how much higher or lower the social 
status of Korean Americans are compared to that of South Koreans.  
One may criticize that a simple comparison can overestimate the income mobility 
effect of migration to the United States, as Korean Americans are more likely to have a 
middle-class background with higher educational attainment compared to the average of 
the population in South Korea. My last interrogation is, therefore, whether the effect of 
international migration remains significant after taking into consideration the differences 
in basic demographic and socioeconomic status between South Koreans and Korean 
Americans. This analysis may shed light on whether the income status of Korean 
Americans is associated with educational attainment or more with residing in the United 
States. In the conclusion, I discuss the implications of the income effect of U.S. residence 
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on our understanding of transnational stratification, paying particular attention to how a 
mechanism of stratification that operates on a transnational level can be different from 
the processes of social selection perceived by the modernization school. 
 
4.1. Socio-economic Status of Korean Americans  
There is an extensive volume of literature on social and economic status of 
Korean immigrants in the United States (e.g., Light and Bonacich 1988; Min 1994, 1996; 
Yoon 1997). These studies have focused on the status of Korean Americans relative to 
other racial and ethnic groups in the United States. Asian Americans, often being called 
“model minority,” are portrayed as an economically successful immigrant community 
(Sakamoto, Goyette, and Kim 2009; Sakamoto and Xie 2006). The Korean American 
community is not an exception. The major indicators of socio-economic status (e.g., 
educational attainment, occupations, and income) seem to support this generally-held 
public perception of Korean immigrants.  
First, a comparison of educational attainment reveals that Korean immigrants are 
highly educated: half (50.6%) of first-generation Korean immigrants hold a bachelor’s 
degree or higher, which is a significantly higher percentage than the general U.S. 





Table 4.1. Social and Economic Status by Race  (%), 2010 
  
Korean 
Immigrant* White Black Hispanic Asian 
US 
General 
Educational level       
   Less than high school graduate 6.8 7.2 15.7 37.6 12.5 13.1 
   High school graduates 23.9 28.4 34.5 28.1 16.2 28.5 
   Some college/Associate degree 18.7 30.8 31.9 21.6 19.2 29.1 
   Four-year college graduates 34.2 21.4 11.9 8.9 30.9 18.8 
   Graduate school graduates 16.4 12.1 6.0 3.9 21.3 10.5 
Employment status       
   Labor force participants 69.3 79.1 72.9 77.4 80.2 78.0 
   Unemployed 7.1 7.7 14.5 10.6 7.3 9.0 
Class of workers        
   Employee of Private Company 57.7 64.3 65.8 75.4 70.3 66.4 
   Employee of Non-profit 
Organization 6.3 8.1 7.9 4.7 6.9 7.5 
   Employee of Government 6.5 15.8 20.6 10.4 11.4 15.4 
   Self-employed in unincorporated 
business 15.8 7.3 4.1 7.2 6.2 6.9 
   Self-employed in incorporated 
business 12.7 4.3 1.6 2.2 4.9 3.7 
   Unpaid family worker 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 
Occupational distribution       
   Management, Business, and 
Financial operators 14.7 15.7 8.8 11.9 11.8 14.7 
   Professional and related 
occupations 38.0 33.2 33.2 36.2 31.2 33.3 
   Service 19.2 19.8 19.5 21.1 16.9 19.7 
   Sales and office 4.8 5.6 6.9 6.3 4.5 5.7 
   Cons, Extract and Maintenance 6.4 10.5 14.1 10.7 11.3 10.9 
   Prod, Trans, Material moving, 
military 16.8 15.2 17.6 13.8 24.4 15.8 
   Occupational prestige scores+ 
(no.) 42.95 42.98 37.39 34.22 44.59 41.12 
Economic well-being       
   Mean Total personal income 44,301 49,584 32,512 30,593 54,102 44,908 
   Mean Total family income 81,225 86,139 55,743 57,105 99,937 78,775 
   Mean Household per-capita 
income 29,651 36,438 23,447 19,469 35,335 32,224 
   Percent below poverty level 11.4 8.7 21.4 20.1 8.5 11.9 
Duncan Socioeconomic index (no.) 37.72 42.19 30.86 27.91 43.28 38.65 
Total N (unweighted) 4,128 1,076,850 146,893 188,805 74,743 1,522,064 
Source of data: American Community Survey 2010. 
Note: All samples are aged 25-64 who do not attend school in 2010 
* The samples are the first-generation Korean Americans who immigrated to the U.S. at 18 years or older  





Even though Korean immigrants have considerably higher educational attainment than 
the general population, the gap between Koreans and the U.S. general is not so much as 
the gap in education. Among Korean immigrants, 51.7 percent hold managerial and 
professional occupations, while 48 percent of the general population do. The 
occupational prestige score is slightly higher for Korean immigrants (43.14) than for the 
general population (41.12), but again this gap is not as large as the gap seen in 
educational attainment between the two groups.   
Korean immigrants are different from the general population in terms of 
employment status.  Compared with the U.S. general population, first generation Korean 
Americans are less likely to be employed by either private companies or government 
sectors. Instead, they are more likely to be self-employed or unpaid family workers. The 
rate of self-employment among Korean immigrants is especially high. Nationally, 28.5 
percent are self-employed, while the rate is 10.6 percent for the general population. 
Among self-employed Koreans, unincorporated business appears more popular than 
incorporated business. In other words, independent small store owners form a majority of 
the Korean self-employment. Other researches examining specific regions or different 
periods confirm the pattern of a higher rate of self-employment (Park 1997; Light and 
Bonacich 1988; Bates 1997; Kim 2006; Min 1995; Yoon 1997).  
A comparison of income status, like the comparison of occupational status, 
illustrates that the educational attainment of Korean immigrants does not get rewarded at 
the same rate as white Americans. First-generation Korean immigrants earn on average 
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$44,301 for their personal income. This is very similar to the average personal income of 
the U.S. general population ($44,908). The average family income of the Korean 
immigrants is a little bit higher than that of the general population ($81,225 and $78,775 
respectively). However, taking into account the difference in family size, we can find that 
the per capita household income of Korean immigrant households falls to a lower level 
than its U.S. average ($29,651 and $32,224, respectively). The Korean immigrants, 
despite their higher educational attainment, earn on average lower incomes (personal, 
family, and per-capita household income) compared to those incomes of non-Hispanic 
whites. Given the situation of limited returns to educational attainment in the U.S. labor 
market, Korean immigrants have found self-employment as an alternative route to 
increase their income. Some studies find a smaller disadvantage in earnings among the 
self-employed than among wageworkers. For example, Light and Bonacich (1988:174-
175), using 1980 PUMS data, reported that the earnings gap between Koreans and non-
Koreans in Los Angeles was 30 percent among wage workers, but only 24 percent among 
the self-employed after controlling for the level of education.  Thus the case can be made 
that, if not for self-employment, the income of Korean immigrants would have been 
below reported levels. All indicators demonstrate that first generation Korean immigrants 
do not surpass the U.S. general population in regards to socioeconomic status. And, 
despite their higher educational attainment, their overall socioeconomic status is lower 
than that of non-Hispanic whites. 
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4.2. Occupations of Pre- and Post-immigration: Upward or Downward Mobility? 
The higher educational attainment may lead us to conjecture that Korean 
immigrants come mainly from the middle class in South Korea. This was true until the 
mid1970s. The vast majority of immigrants between 1965 and 1975 were white-collar 
workers (Yoon 1997:91). From 1965 to 1974, occupational preferences were the most 
popular entry mechanism among Korean immigrants (Yoon 1997:86). Each year, about 
30 percent came to the U.S. through U.S. occupational preferences. These people, several 
years after their arrival, obtained U.S. citizenship and became eligible to invite their 
siblings from South Korea (Yoon 1997:87). As a result, after 1976, family network-based 
immigration increased rapidly and it diversified the class background of immigrants. 
Consequently there was a diminishing selectivity in occupation: the relative number of 
professional workers has declined on one hand, while the representation of manual 
laborers, farmers, and service workers has increased (Yoon 1997:90). This history of 
immigration created a diverse Korean immigrant community regarding class background 
(Abelmann and Lie 1995:77).  
 Although there is no nation-wide survey on the pre-migration background of 
Korean Americans, there are two regional surveys that lead us to grasp a better picture of 
the individual-level occupational transition of Korean immigrants. The one is a DC-based 
survey, A Survey of the Washington DC Korean Community, which was conducted in 
2003. According to the DC survey, among 183 Korean male immigrants whose pre-
migration occupation was answered, the largest proportion (31.7%) had professional 
occupations before their immigration, followed by those who used to be self-employed 
(10.9%). Technical workers account for 9.3 percent of the pre-migration occupation, and 
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the same percent is also found for service workers. Students constitute the fifth popular 
pre-migration occupation, recording 8.7 percent. The other regional survey is a LA-based 
survey conducted in 2004, Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan 
Los Angeles (IIMMLA). This survey sampled young adult (ages 20-39) children of 
immigrants in metropolitan Los Angeles (Rumbaut et al. 2004). There are 174 samples 
for second-generation Korean Americans whose father’s pre-migration occupation is 
known. Although using a different classification of occupations, the LA survey displays a 
similar pattern of distribution of pre-migration occupation to that presented by DC 
survey. According to the LA survey, 39.8 percent of Korean fathers had worked as 
professional or technical workers before their migration, and 21.9 percent as managers, 
officers, or proprietors.  
 
Table 4.2. Occupational transition of selective pre-migration occupations among Korean 
male immigrants in D.C. (%) 
  Occupation before migration  
Current occupation in U.S. Professional 
Self-
employed Service Technical Student 
Managerial 5.2 0.0 11.8 0.0 6.3 
Professional 58.6 15.0 5.9 17.6 62.5 
Sales & administrative 3.4 5.0 5.9 5.9 0.0 
Service 6.9 20.0 29.4 5.9 0.0 
Farming, forestry, & fishing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Precision, production, crafts, & repair 0.6 5.0 0.0 5.9 0.0 
Fabricator & laborer 1.7 0.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 
Self-employed 12.1 35.0 29.4 47.1 12.5 
Technical 3.4 15.0 11.8 17.6 12.5 
Unemployed 5.2 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 
Total (N) 100 (58) 100 (20) 
100 
(17) 100 (17) 100 (16) 
% out of total pre-migration 
occupations 31.7 10.9 9.3 9.3 8.7 
Source: A Survey of the Washington DC Korean Community in 2003 
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Now the question is what the occupational transition looks like. For instance, how 
many professional workers in South Korea keep their professional status; how many of 
them have changed to other occupations after immigration? Among Korean male 
respondents in D.C., about 40 percent failed to uphold their professional occupations 
after their arrival. A considerable proportion (12.1%) of the pre-migration professionals 
became self-employers after coming to the United States. Among the formerly self-
employed, 35 percent are still self-employed, while 20 percent switched to service 
occupations. Most interesting is those who used to have technical occupations in South 
Korea. Only 17.6 percent hold the same kind of occupations, but almost a half (47.1%) 
chose self-employment for their livelihood in the new destination. For immigrants who 
came as students, the majority (62.5%), not surprisingly, took professional occupations in 
the United States. The LA survey (IIMMLA) illustrates a similar pattern. Among Korean 
immigrant fathers who had professional or technical occupation in South Korea, 59.7 
percent uphold the same professional or technical occupations, 12.5 percent became 
craftsmen, and 9.7 percent are found among managers, officials, and proprietors. The rate 
of staying in a professional occupation is lower for Korean immigrant fathers than for 
Filipino (81.8%) and Vietnamese immigrants (75.0%), while similar to that for immigrant 
fathers from China (58.3%). Given the fact that Filipino and Vietnamese immigrants are 
more likely to retain professional jobs, language barriers (which are less significant 
among Filipinos) on one hand, and resources for self-employment (which are less 
prevalent among Vietnamese) on the other hand, may serve as driving Korean 
immigrants away from professional occupations. The existing literature and the results of 
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DC and LA surveys, all advocate the argument that Korean immigrants are likely to keep 
or fall down in regards to their occupational status, not move up.  
Many of these Korean migrants who changed their occupation chose self-
employment after arrival to the new country. In fact, self-employment was one of only a 
few options they can choose due to language barriers and non-transferrable human capital 
(Bates 1997; Min 1996; Waldinger 1996; Chiswick and Miller 2009). Self-employed 
Koreans are more likely to be found in the Korean ethnic enclave or other minority 
communities, not in mainstream society, while playing a role as a middleman minority 
(Bonacich 1973; Light and Bonacich 1988; Min 1996). The Korean ethnic enclave also 
finds many Korean employed workers who are not professionals.  
Many non-professional Korean immigrant workers find themselves in a secondary 
labor market of the dual labor-market systems (Bonacich 1972; Gordon 1972; Gordon, 
Edwards, and Reich 1982). Secondary labor markets are characterized by lower returns to 
human capital due to a lower demand for skill, compared to primary labor markets. The 
returns to human capital are more complicated in ethnic enclaves or “middleman” 
businesses. Wilson and Portes (1980), distinguishing ethnic enclaves from the secondary 
labor markets, argued that enclave workers enjoyed significant returns to past human 
capital, but such returns were not found among immigrant workers in the secondary labor 
market. Regardless of whether they are working in the ethnic enclave or in the secondary 
labor market, given the characteristics of these labor markets, it seems unlikely that 
Korean immigrants receive as much of earnings returns to their human capital or 
occupational status as they received or enjoyed in the pre-migration labor market. Why, 
despite the high likelihood of occupational downward mobility and the loss of the values 
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of their achieved human capital in South Korea, does Korean immigration to the United 
States continue to occur?  What are the structural contexts that make this migration 
rational?23 This question is difficult to answer within a nation-state framework that 
focuses only on the U.S. context. Instead, we must take the transnational context of 
stratification into consideration. 
 
4.3. Comparisons of Incomes of South Koreans and Korean Americans 
The earlier discussion indicates that occupational opportunity is less attractive for 
Korean migrants to the United States. Then what is it that motivates their migration? 
Income, as a major indicator of social status, can be considered as one form of 
compensation for the downgrading of occupational status.24 Income is a social status 
indicator that gains more importance in a transnational context. For instance, a significant 
number of Korean Americans have considered returning to South Korea with money they 
earned in the United States (World Korean, 9.15.2010). In many cases, this was 
motivated partly by the relatively higher value of the dollar and its purchasing power in 
South Korea. Transnational investment is also often practiced. Many Korean Americans 
                                                     
23 Whether or how rational individual decision making is depends on a context as Portes 
noted, “global processes ultimately create the context for individual-level decision-
making: “It is within the context of extensive social and economic penetration of 
peripheral societies by the institutions of advanced capitalism that individual cost-benefit 
calculations make sense.”(Portes 2007:77, in Sanderson 2012:463)” 
 
24 Seeking better educational opportunity for their children is also one of main reasons for 
Korean immigrants in the United States. The cost for English education has rapidly 
grown so that it became a heavy burden for parents in South Korea. In this situation, 
many middle-class parents consider educational migration to the United States as a good 
way to provide better English education with less competitive cost (by letting their 
children attend a public school). That is, in further research, income benefits of the 
migration should include a benefit from saving the expense of English education.  
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visited South Korea in 2008 and 2009 to purchase real estate, when the value of Korean 
currency (won, or KRW) fell drastically relative to the U.S. dollar (Joongang.ca, 
3.30.2009). Observing the purchasing power of Korean Americans in South Korea, South 
Koreans also experience the value of the U.S. dollar. The gap in purchasing power 
between Korean currency and the U.S. dollar is also found when Koreans consume in the 
United States. Today, many middle-class Korean parents have sent or came with their 
children to America for an English education, and find themselves in a struggle to pay for 
tuition and living costs when their money is devaluated by the exchange rate between 
KRW and US dollar. As people become more aware of the quality of life for people in 
other countries, the reference group for people’s subjective identification of their social 
status becomes more transnational. This section investigates on the income standing of 
South Koreans and Korean Americans in a transnational perspective. Comparisons of 
income status of South Koreans and Korean Americans may improve our understanding 
of transnational stratification revolving on Korean international migration.  
 
Data and methods 
For transnational income comparisons, I merged two national surveys: the 
National Household Income and Expenditure Survey (NHIES) in 2007 (administered by 
the Korea National Statistical Office) for South Koreans, and the 2005-07 American 
Community Survey (ACS) 3-year dataset for Korean Americans (Ruggles et al. 2010).  In 
this exercise, only householders are selected for samples.25 I distinguished the entire 
                                                     
25 While in ACS each individual household member in the same household has its own 
row , the arrangement of the data in NHIES is based on household units. That is, spouse’s 
and children’s information (such as education, income, occupation, etc) are arranged in 
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Korean samples into three subgroups: Koreans who remained in South Korea (hereafter, 
South Koreans, or KOR), Korean immigrants who came to the United States at 18 years 
old or older (hereafter, Korean immigrants, or KIM), and the children of Korean 
immigrants who came to the United States at 17 years old or younger or were born in the 
United States (hereafter, children of Korean immigrants, or KUS). The purpose of 
separating Korean Americans into KIM and KUS is that KIM is expected to present a 
more direct income effect of migration to the U.S., while KUS to suggest the migration’s 
more indirect and potential effect for next generations as a proxy for intergenerational 
mobility. Each Korean group is again divided into ten income deciles from the richest 10 
percent (marked as KOR10, KIM10, and KUS10) to the poorest 10 percent (as KOR1, 
KIM1, and KUS1) based on the ranked per-capita household income.26 The income level 
of each decile is represented by the mean household per-capita income. There are total 30 
income deciles (i.e., KOR1~10, KIM1~10, and KUS1~10).  I used FX to convert South  
Korean’s income in Korean won (KRW) to the U.S. dollars. The average rate of 
exchange in 2007 was 929.2 won to 1 dollar. 27 
 
Results 
                                                                                                                                                              
the same row with householder’s income. This makes it difficult merging data for 
spouses and children in two datasets.  
 
26 To estimate per-capita household income, I divided total household income by the size 
of household. I did not use “equivalence” per-capita income (which divides by the square 
root of the family or household size). The equivalence income measure takes into account 
some economies of scale. Therefore, this is preferred in studying welfare or well-being of 
family. However, I did not use this equivalence measure because my interest was more in 
the economic position of households, rather than the welfare.   
 
27 For the average rates of exchange in each year, see Historical Exchange Rates (Chart 
and Table, 1971-present) (http://currate.com/historical-exchange-rates) 
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Figure 4.1 exhibits that KUS consistently earned the highest mean household 
incomes at each income level, followed by KIM. South Koreans (KOR) earned the lowest  
mean income at every decile (except for the lowest decile).  
Note: Selected samples are householders only.  
Source of data: The National Household Income and Expenditure Survey in 2007 for South 
Koreans (KOR); the 2005-07 American Community Survey 3-year dataset for Korean Americans 
(KIM and KUS) 
 
 
However, income gains from crossing the border are not equally distributed across 
income levels. Figure 4.1 reveals a trend that the richer the income group, the larger the 
gap between South Koreans and Korean Americans. The gap between the groups in 
decile’s mean income is largest at the richest decile, and second largest at the second 
richest decile. By contrast, there is no noticeable gap found between South Koreans and 














































Korean Americans at the poorest decile. The income of KIM1 (the poorest decile of 
Korean immigrants) is even lower than that of KOR1. Similarly, the other income deciles 
in the lower half do not present substantial income gaps between Koreans and Korean 
immigrants. The results imply that Korean people who have middle- and upper-class 
background gain more income benefit from migration to the United States, while those in 
a lower class do not. 
To estimate the income standings of KIM and KUS relative to KOR, I included 
those groups and constructed transnational income deciles for South Koreans and Korean 
Americans, by ranking all households in the three Korean groups from richest ten percent 
to poorest ten percent based on household per-capita income. Then I examined what 
proportion of each Korean group is found at each income decile. According to figure 4.2, 
about one fourth of KIM and a half of KUS are found in the richest 10 percent of all 
Koreans, comprising both South Koreans and Korean Americans, while only 5 percent of 
KOR are placed in the same group. Expanding our look to the second richest decile (i.e., 
KOR9, KIM9, and KUS9), we can find that 13.7 percent of KOR earned incomes 
belonging to the richest 20 percent, while 40.7 percent of KIM and 66 percent of KUS 
achieved the same level of income. In sum, the results of the transnational income 
comparisons illustrate that Korean’s international migration to the United States is 
strongly and positively related to their achievement of richest 10- or 20-percent income 
position.28  
                                                     
28 This result does not mean the causal relationship between international migration and 
achieving the income status of the richest 10- or 20 percent among all three Korean 
groups. There are many variables to be controlled to find the pure effect of international 
migration that is not affected by migration selectivity, such as the pre-migration 
socioeconomic status of the migrants.    
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Note: Selected samples are householders only.  
Source of data: The National Household Income and Expenditure Survey in 2007 for South 
Koreans (KOR); the 2005-07 American Community Survey 3-year dataset for Korean Americans 
(KIM and KUS) 
 
 
 As we have seen, comparing the mean household per-capita incomes of each 
income decile reveals the relative standings of each group in the transnational income 
layers. However, it is still unclear which factors are main contributors to the level of 
income for each group. The following part examines which kind of factors between 
achieved and categorical attributes is more associated with income, focusing particularly 
on the effects of educational attainment (for the role of achievements) and country of 
residence (for the role of categorical attributes).   
 
4.4. Comparisons of the Effects of Education and Location  
This section examines how much of a role educational attainment as an achieved 
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South Koreans (KOR) and how it differs for Korean immigrants (KIM) and that of the 
children of Korean immigrants (KUS). Given occupational downgrading among Korean 
immigrants and their higher presence in self-employment, especially in Korean ethnic 
enclaves, I hypothesize that the association of educational attainment with income for 
Korean immigrants is weaker than that for South Koreans. On the other hand, however, a 
blocked mobility thesis (referring to limited opportunity to upward mobility in South 
Korea) expects that, as there are more opportunities in industrial or post-industrial sectors 
in the United States than in South Korea, the role of their human capital becomes more 
important in the former than the latter. A second hypothesis is that, for Koreans, income 
is more associated with country of residence (i.e., whether residing in the U.S. or in South 
Korea) than with educational attainment. If this hypothesis appears to be true, the result 
challenges the modernization perspective on one hand, advocates the argument of some 
global inequality scholars (e.g., Korzeniewicz and Moran 2009; Milanovic 2010)  who 
highlight a significant importance of nationality as a criterion for stratification at 
transnational and global levels on the other.  
It is hardly expected that the role of human capital such as the returns to education 
is the same across all income levels (Budig and Hodges 2010; Hao and Naiman 2007) .29 
Higher income earners are likely to be found in primary sectors characterized by the 
determining role of human capital such as educational attainment in income, while lower 
                                                     
29 Given this different effect of education at different income levels, some scholars 
suggest quintile regression analysis as a proper way to examine income inequality (e.g., 
Budig and Hodges 2010; Hao and Naiman 2007). This study, instead of using quintile 
analysis, did separate investigations on the two extreme income groups: the top quarter 
(as a proxy of upper-middle class) and the bottom quarter (as a proxy of lower-working 
class), in addition to the analysis for the entire population as being more interested in the 
role of education by broader, categorically different, groups.  
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income earners are likely to be populated in secondary sectors where co-ethnic networks 
or other ascribed attributes, rather than educational attainment, are probably more 
important. Thus it is reasonable to expect that high income groups are more likely to 
experience a greater effect of achieved status on their income, while low income groups 
may experience a greater effect as a result of their ascribed status. For this reason, I 
selected the highest-quarter samples (the richest 25%) of income and the lowest-quarter 
samples (the poorest 25%) from each group (KOR, KIM, and KUS, respectively), in 
addition to using each total sample for analyses. Each sample was composed of 
householders at ages 30 to 54 years.30 I used ordinary least square (OLS) multiple 
regression model. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of individual 
householders’ total annual income. For independent variables, I included education as 
human capital and gender as ascribed characteristics. The other controlling variables 
include gender, age,31 the presence of a spouse and the urban-rural status of residence. In 
order to find the group in which the effect of the achieved factor (i.e., education) on 
income is larger and the group in which the effects of ascribed factors are more 
pronounced, I compared coefficients of each variable in each KOR, KIM and KUS. Then 
I merged the two datasets (NHIES and ACS) and created a country variable that refers to 
                                                     
30 I selected this range of age (30-54) considering the context of the South Korean labor 
market where a significant portion of people before 30 years old do not find a job or not 
in the labor force (due to increasingly longer period of education) and people after 54 are 
less likely to remain in workforce because the retirement age is around this age in private 
companies.  
 
31 I put age as a control variable in the model because it is not clear whether age should 
be treated as achievement or ascribed characteristics. Some treat age as a proxy of 
achievement because they assume that age reflects work experience. Some others may 
treat age as a categorical characteristic because it does not depend on individual 
achievement and workers can be treated differently by their age itself in a labor market. 
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country of residence. With the merged dataset, I investigated how much of an effect the 
country variable had on their income at each income group (i.e., the general population, 
the richest income quarter, and the poorest income quarter) and compared the effect of 
the country variable with that of the education variable.  
 
Socio-economic Profile of Samples 
Table 4.3 presents characteristics of selected variables at each income group. The 
first row presents annual personal mean and median income of individual householders, 
which shows that South Koreans typically have lower annual incomes than Korean 
immigrants and children of Korean immigrants. This result is the same for the two 
extreme income groups. The highest-quarter groups (say, upper-middle class) of income 
display a higher gap in personal income than their lowest-quarter counterparts (say, low 
class) between South Koreans and Korean Americans (both KIM and KUS). In terms of 
gender, male householders are predominant, especially in the richest 25 percent. The 
male dominance in the richest 25 percent is most pronounced among South Koreans. The 
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Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for Urban Household Heads Aged 30-54, 2007     
  General   Richest quarter    Poorest quarter  
  KOR KIM* KUS**   KOR KIM* KUS**   KOR KIM* KUS** 
Annual personal income (dollars in 2007)            
      Mean 34,863 57,967 84,597  64,718 131,587 191,335  12,925 13,853 20,504 
      Median 30,220 41,493 61,920  57,400 103,474 141,718  13,689 15,147 21,655 
Men (%) 79.4 63.3 60.3  95.9 82.6 77.1  51.1 46.6 49.7 
Median Age 43.0 45.0 36.0  43.0 45.0 38.0  44.0 46.0 36.0 
Married, spouse present (%) 74.9 72.5 61.8  91.4 84.0 73.3  50.2 61.6 55.9 
Level of Highest Education Completed (%)            
     Less Than High School 15.0 4.1 1.5  2.2 0.8 0.0  31.7 8.9 4.8 
     High school 46.5 18.1 7.5  30.0 6.3 1.6  51.8 25.5 15.4 
     Some College 10.0 18.1 19.7  12.6 12.4 6.2  5.7 20.9 29.5 
     BA 24.8 34.0 39.6  44.0 40.4 31.6  9.2 26.9 36.4 
     Post-BA 3.7 25.7 31.6  11.2 40.2 60.7  1.5 17.8 13.9 
Total Number of Sample 54,471 3,876 2,171   8,507 874 516   8,508 899 519 
Source: For South Koreans (KOR), the 2007 National Household Income and Expenditure Survey (NHIES), Korea National Statistics Office 
                For Korean Americans, 2005-07 American Community Survey (ACS), 3-year dataset 
Note: * Korean immigrants (KIM) refer to those who immigrated to the United States at 18 years old or older. 
            ** Children of Korean immigrants (KUS) refers to those who were U.S.-born or came to the United States at 17 years old or younger 
          The samples are urban residents only 
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children of Korean immigrants, as expected, are younger than the other groups. South 
Koreans are more likely to be married and live with their spouse compared to Korean 
Americans.  
Literature on immigrants, especially on Asian immigrants, shows that immigrants 
were not randomly selected. They were more likely to come from the highly-educated 
middle class and equipped with a higher aspiration for success. Such migration selectivity 
is found among Korean Americans as well. Looking at educational attainment, we find 
that KUS are most highly educated (e.g., 71.2 percent hold college degrees), while KOR 
exhibit the lowest educational output (e.g., 28.5 percent are college graduates). Given the 
selectivity, the simple cross-country analysis may overestimate the pure effect of country 
of residence. The overestimation of the effect of country can be reduced by taking into 
account the effect of the higher educational attainment on their income.  
 
The Effects of Educational Attainment among South Koreans and Korean Americans  
 Table 4.4 reveals that KUS receive higher returns to their college education than 
KOR and KIM in general. KUS in general, especially, enjoy significant benefits from 
their bachelor’s degrees and even greater benefits from post-bachelor’s degrees. It is not 
surprising that KUS earn better returns given that the U.S. labor market gives more credit 
to KUS who presumably have attended U.S. educational institutes than it does to those 
who have received educations in foreign countries (Zeng and Xie 2004). Another reason 
of the significant gap between KUS and KIM is perhaps the different characteristics of  
labor markets in which they work. The mass media often reports stories depicting Korean 
immigrants with middle-class backgrounds having begun their careers at the bottom of  
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Table 4.4. Regressions of Log  Personal Income on Demographic Characteristics and Educational Attainment by 
Immigrant Status and by Income, 2007 
  General   Richest quarter   Poorest quarter 
Variables KOR KIM KUS   KOR KIM KUS   KOR KIM KUS 
(Constant) 8.334*** 8.533*** 5.745***  10.648*** 11.039*** 10.406***  10.504*** 9.565*** 8.828*** 
Level of Highest Education 
Completed             
(Ref=High School Graduate)            
     Less Than High school -.396*** -.182 -.407*  -.083*** -.229 n.a.  -.097*** .001 -.078 
     Some College .249*** .210*** .202*  -.020 .027 .013  -.005 .026 -.032 
     BA .352*** .382*** .558***  -.022** .018 .002  -.046* -.137 -.057 
     Post-BA .473*** .464*** 1.076***  0.010 .047 .158  -.237*** -.267* .156* 
Demographic Characteristics            
    Men  .448*** .500*** .446***  .086*** .112* .101  -.025 .266** .364*** 
    Age .048*** .057 .215***  .005 .035 .078  -.050*** -.024 .055 
    Age Squared -.000*** -.000 -.003***  .000 .000 .000  .001*** .000 .000 
    Married, Spouse Present  .239*** .006 -.024  .007 .045 .088  .096*** -.189* -.222** 
    Urban Residence (Ref=Others) .027*** .118 .038  .040*** .096 -.116  .053*** .123 -.089 
                
Adjusted R Square .295*** .096*** .203***   .032*** .005 .034***   .022*** .012* .041*** 
Note: Estimates of effects of selected variables represent unstandardized coefficients (b)  
* p≤..05; ** p≤..01;  *** p≤..001 (two-tailed test). 
All samples are aged 30 to 54 and householders in cities (for KOR) or in metropolitans (for KIM and KUS). 
  Source of data: The National Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2007 for South   Koreans (KOR); America 
Community Survey 2005-07 3-year dataset for KIM and KUS 
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the ladder in the United States, for instance, as janitors, cleaning men, or workers in the 
poultry industry. It is also widely known that many Korean immigrants are self-employed 
as small business owners or work in ethnic enclaves (Min 1995, 1996; Yoon 1997), 
where college degrees are not so much needed.  
However, it is surprising that returns to education for KIM are in fact not lower 
than those for KOR.32 Put differently, even though the Korean society is famous for its 
fervor for college degrees, unlike my hypothesis, South Koreans do not receive as great a 
return from their college degrees as 1.5 or second generation Korean Americans do. One 
possible reason is the serious supply-demand imbalance – the excess of supply over 
demand – of college graduates in South Korea. This result requires further study on the 
causes of the lower returns to college education for South Koreans. 
The standardized coefficients33 of independent variables within each group, 
although not displayed in this paper, demonstrate that South Koreans and Korean 
immigrants in general experience the larger effects of ascribed characteristics (i.e., gender 
and age) over achieved ones (i.e., educational attainments). For the children of Korean 
immigrants in contrast, their college degrees and post-college degrees bring more returns 
than their ascribed gender status.  
Among richest-quarter income levels, interestingly, South Koreans benefit a little 
less from bachelor’s degrees than from only graduating from high school and show no 
                                                     
32 Some of KIM may earn college degrees in the United States as they arrived in the 
United States at 18 years old or older. U.S. credential may play significantly different 
role in earnings (Zeng and Xie 2004). Thus, further research should take the place of 
credentials into account.  
 
33 The standardized coefficients help us to compare the effects of achieved factors to that 
of ascribed ones within the models of each group. 
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significant income premium of post-BA degrees. For Korean immigrants and their 
children, educational attainment has no significant effect on income. This result 
demonstrates that the status of upper-class income earners is little associated with their 
education for all the three groups.  
Among poorest-quarter income earners, BA and post-BA degrees are significantly 
and negatively associated with income for KOR. For KIM, similarly, post-BA degrees 
are negatively associated with income, while BA degrees are not related to income. For 
KUS, education is not a significant factor to income. Gender status, instead, matters more 
for both Korean American groups at the poorest quarter: being a man is positively 
associated with income. These results imply that it is the middle-class income earners 
who receive the greatest benefits from attaining BA or post-BA degrees for all three 
Korean groups.  
 
The Effects of US residence among South Koreans and Korean Americans 
 From a transnational perspective, we are interested in the effect of international 
migration on income mobility. As we are especially interested in the comparison of the 
relative effects of country of residence (as the indicator of the effect of international 
migration) to the effect of education (i.e., of attaining BA and post-BA degrees) within a 
group, we compare standardized coefficients (Beta) of each variable. 
Figure 4.3 displays that, among all Koreans in general, returns to international 
migration (or the effect of country of residence) are lower than those related to BA and 
post-BA degrees (See also Table 4.5 for the results of the whole models). For Korean 
immigrants in general (figure 4.4), the effect of their migration to the United States is 
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about three times lower than the effect of completing a college or post-college education 
(compared to completing only secondary school). The children of Korean immigrants in 
general (as seen in figure 4.5) receive significant income benefits from their migration, 
but are still lower than the benefits of earning BA or post-BA degrees. 
 
Notes: The samples include all three Korean groups (KOR, KIM, and KUS)  
            * p≤..05; ** p≤..01;  *** p≤..001 (two-tailed test). 
All samples are aged 30 to 54 and householders in cities (KOR) or metropolitans (KIM and KUS)  
  Source of data: The National Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2007 for South   
Koreans (KOR); America Community Survey 2005-07 3-year dataset for KIM and KUS 
 
 
  However, the effects of international migration to the United States (i.e., the effect 
of USA as the country of residence) differ substantially between the richest quarter and 
the poorest quarter. For Korean immigrants in the richest 25 percent (see figure 4.4), the 
effect of residing in the United States on personal income is significant, being about six 
times as high as the effect of earning a post-BA degree. For children of Korean 
immigrants in the richest quarter (see figure 4.5), the premium of residing in the United 























Figure 4.3. Effects of Country and Education in general and by 





country of residence is the most effective way to increase income. By contrast, in the 
poorest 25 percent population, living in the United States is negatively associated with 
income. This is common for all three Korean populations.   
 
Notes: The samples include South Koreans (KOR) and Korean immigrants (KIM). 
            * p≤..05; ** p≤..01;  *** p≤..001 (two-tailed test). 
       All samples are aged 30 to 54 and householders in cities (KOR) or metropolitans (KIM)  
  Source of data: The National Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2007 for South   
Koreans (KOR); America Community Survey 2005-07 3-year dataset for KIM  
 
 
Notes: The samples include South Koreans (KOR) and Korean immigrants (KUS). 
            * p≤..05; ** p≤..01;  *** p≤..001 (two-tailed test). 
       All samples are aged 30 to 54 and householders in cities (KOR) or metropolitans (KUS)  
  Source of data: The National Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2007 for South   






















Figure 4.4. Effects of Country and Education in general and by 























Figure 4.5. Effects of Country and Education in general and by 





Table 4.5. Effect of Country of Residence and Educational Attainment on Log Annual Personal Income among South 
Koreans and Korean Americans, 2007 














Country of Residence            
     USA  (Ref=Korea)      .066*** .186*** .141***  .309*** .452*** .387***  -.142*** -.124*** -.151*** 
Level of Highest Education 
Completed (Ref=High School 
Graduate)            
     Less Than High school -.169*** -.175*** -.154***  -.042*** -.027** -.035***  -.070*** -.074*** -.068*** 
     Some College .103*** .095*** .091***  -.014 -.038*** -.043***  -.008 .000 -.010 
     BA .212*** .213*** .207***  -.009 -.033** -.031**  -.026* -.022* -.029** 
     Post-BA .158*** .191*** .198***  .046*** .097*** .103***  -.067*** -.047*** -.066*** 
Demographic Characteristics            
    Men  .237*** .237*** .232***  .071*** .087*** .083***  .007 .008 .030** 
    Age .445*** .456*** .395***  .236 .511*** .294*  -.537*** -.462*** -.449*** 
    Age Squared -.351*** -.358*** -.328***  -.114 -.387** -.217  .482*** .390** .395** 
    Married, Spouse Present  .119*** .124*** .103***  .026* .040*** .028**  .046*** .054*** .030** 
    Urban Status  .015*** .015*** .015***  .038*** .033*** -.032***  .027** .026* .022* 
Adjusted R Square .263*** .310*** .268***   .121*** .200*** .174***   .040*** .033*** .042*** 
Note: Estimates of effects of selected variables represent standardized coefficients. 
 + The samples include South Koreans and Korean immigrants 
 ++ The samples include South Koreans and the U.S.-born or raised Korean Americans. 
All samples are aged 30 to 54            
* p≤..05; ** p≤..01;  *** p≤..001            
Source: The National Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2007 for KOR; American Community Survey (2005-07) 3-year dataset 
(KIM and KUS). 
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4.5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 As we have seen, Korean immigrants did not experience upward mobility in 
occupation. About a half of Korean immigrants who had been professionals took an 
occupation with lower prestige (including self-employment) than that of their pre-
migration occupation. In the U.S. labor market, Korean immigrants, despite their higher 
educational attainment than whites, do not earn higher income than that of whites. 
Nevertheless, the findings of this study reveal that the international migration to the 
United States is beneficial for both Korean immigrants and especially the children of 
Korean immigrants. Its benefits are especially high for richer groups (i.e., the richest 25 
percent). By changing their country of residence, the middle and upper classes enjoy 
much higher incomes compared to their counterparts in the country of origin.  
This project also examined the effects of education and international migration to 
the United States from a transnational perspective. The simple comparisons of the 
unstandardized coefficients of each of the three groups address that returns to college 
education are higher for the children of Korean immigrants than they are for South 
Koreans and Korean immigrants. For South Koreans and Korean immigrants, as the 
standardized coefficients indicate, ascribed characteristics such as gender and age have 
slightly larger effects on individuals’ income than educational achievement. For the 
children of Korean immigrants, by contrast, the effect of earning college or post-college 
degrees is greater than that of ascribed gender status.  
 Integrating the two different sets of data and creating the new variable of USA as 
the “country of residence,” we found that, among all Korean groups in the richest quarter, 
the effects of a US residence are substantially higher than those of attaining BA or post-
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BA degrees, but this country effect does not appear significantly higher for all Koreans 
(including all income groups), and can even be associated negatively with income for 
those in the poorest quarter. Thus, from the transnational perspective, we can infer that 
moving to and settling down in the United States is an attractive income mobility strategy 
among middle- and upper-class Koreans. Working-class Koreans, by contrast, are less 
likely to experience such benefits from migration to the United States.  
The findings of this project challenge the modernization perspective which states 
that, as a society becomes modernized and industrialized, achievements or human capital 
become more important than ascription to an individuals’ status. Using the transnational 
perspective that takes outside-country opportunities into account, this project reveals that, 
despite its industrialization, one’s investment in human capital (e.g., college and post-




                                                     
34 The role of U.S. college degrees may be different, as noted Zeng and Xie (2004); it 
may give substantial benefits, provided the relatively strong association of education with 
the income of the children of Korean immigrants. This also suggests that the effects of 





Chapter 5. Human Capital and Categorical Inequality: A Destination 
The global income inequality and the growing importance of international 
migration for social mobility continue to produce immigrant minority groups in 
destinations. The United States, inherently an immigrant country, was acclaimed as a 
land of opportunity for immigrants. The country of the “American Dream” opened its 
door to foreign people and proudly purported that anyone can be a hero of Horatio 
Alger’s rags-to-riches’ story if he or she has the characteristics of “modern” men (being 
educated, working hard, and having perseverance), no matter what his/her race is. People 
migrate to America with such an “American Dream.”  For people in this land of 
opportunity, individual efforts and achievements are thought to be the essential factor 
determining the success or failure of individuals.  
However, some critical scholars argue that, even within the modernized society, a 
significant portion of people’s social and economic status can be accounted by their 
categorical characteristics (Massey 2007; Tilly 1999). They demonstrate that the modern 
institutions of the wealthy nation (supposed to be universal and merit-based) entail an 
exclusion of categorical minorities (Bonilla-Silva 2006). If the American society seems to 
be an open society, it should be because the attention of the existing literature has 
disproportionately been on the majority whites (Brym and Lie 2006:234-235). In this 
case, its findings and conclusions, accordingly, reflect the stratification of the majority at 
best.  
This chapter delves into the stratification (or social selection processes) of 
minorities by placing a racial/ethnic minority group at the center in stratification of a 
receiving society. For minorities, human capital may be not as important for minorities’ 
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social mobility as it is for a majority; some other (categorical) characteristics may play 
more significant roles among minority workers. Before doing empirical analyses, I first 
discuss the nature of the U.S. society called a modern nation, paying particular attention 
to how (seemingly universally inclusive) modern institutions such as citizenship and 
labor market institutions have differently treated racial/ethnic minorities. Then, I examine 
racial differences in the extent of income inequality and income determinants, focusing 
on the case of Korean Americans. 
 
5.1. U.S. Institutions as Selectively Exclusive  
In this section, I explore citizenship and the labor-market institution as two central 
institutions of modern nations. Citizenship, referring to full membership in a community 
in which one lives, is construed as the core of modern institutional arrangement 
characterized by a shift from particularistic to universal-based and from 
restricted/exclusive to inclusive society. In the United States, citizenship has its 
philosophical grounding in the doctrine of natural rights and principles of equality. Thus, 
in principle, citizenship, as natural and universal rights for human being, should not 
exclude some groups of people based on their categories such as race, gender, or class. 
 U.S. citizenship as an institution, however, is far from this principle (Glenn 2002; 
Bloemraad 2006). For instance, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 prohibited Chinese 
from naturalizing and suspended the immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States 
until 1943. About two decades after the Chinese Exclusion Act, in 1904, it was extended 
to Japanese laborers. During this period of time, not only Chinese and Japanese, but other 
East or South Asian immigrants also were affected by the exclusionary atmosphere that 
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barred them from being naturalized (Bloemraad 2006:21). A series of such exclusions of 
Asian immigrants from U.S. citizenship by the U.S. congress were made to protect 
mainly its first-class (i.e., white male) citizens. The serials of exclusion acts of that time 
were mostly responses to the backlash of the (white male) citizen workers who were 
seeing themselves in an increasing competition with immigrant workers. Particularly, the 
Chinese exclusion Act was implemented when Americans experienced the depression of 
the 1870s and an increasing number of Chinese workers searching jobs after the 
completion of the transcontinental railroad. Americans feared that these Chinese 
immigrants depressed wages and took jobs that rightly belonged to them (Usdansky and 
Espenshade 2001:27). Their fear resulted in massive backlashes of American workers 
against the immigrant workers. This was a decisive trigger for the establishment of the 
restrictive act (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). The exclusionary acts were in nature an 
effort to protect U.S. workers, by keeping immigrants from participating in competition. 
Usdansky and Espenshade (2001:29) described the background of Chinese and Japanese 
exclusion Acts:  
 
During the first decade of the twentieth century, concern about 
competition from immigrant workers focused on a new group of Asians – 
Japanese laborers – who began coming to the United States in increasing 
numbers after Chinese laborers were excluded in 1882. Most Japanese 
immigrants settled in California and worked in agriculture, where they 
were widely seen as “too successful,” a concern that gave way to the fear 
of a “yellow peril” … By 1904, the American Federation of Labor was 
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vigorously lobbying Congress to extend the Chinese Exclusion Act to 
Japanese laborers.  
 
 
Exclusion by citizenship was not limited to political rights; it restrained economic rights 
of some Asian laborers who threatened white citizen workers. In the 1910s, by the Alien 
Land Acts, these “alien ineligible for citizenship” were prohibited from owning land. 
Asian male immigrants were (not legally but practically) excluded from marrying U.S. 
female citizen by their ineligibility to be citizens. The Cable Act of 1922 excluded any 
woman citizen who married an “alien ineligible for citizenship” from the category of the 
U.S. citizen (Glenn 2002:25–26). Thus, as Glenn argues, the construction of the U.S. 
citizenship went through a racialized and gendered process. She said that “race and 
gender have continuously been organizing principles of American citizenship; 
concomitantly, race and gender have been primarily axes for contesting boundaries and 
rights” (Glenn 2002:26). Roger Smith characterizes the American citizenship as 
selectively exclusionary on the basis of ascribed characteristics. He argued that “despite 
lofty ideals, citizenship in the United Sates had a strong tendency to “ascriptive 
Americanism”: legal statues, judicial decisions, and legislative debates “manifested 
passionate beliefs that America was by rights a white nation, a Protestant nation, a nation 
in which true Americans were native-born men with Anglo-Saxon ancestors” (Bloemraad 
2006:21). In short, this critical discussion reveals that the real nature of citizenship is 
inclusive only for native-born white men but exclusive for other categorical minorities.  
Free labor (as opposed to servitude) and the “openness” of the labor market 
constitute another important distinctive institutional arrangement of modern nations. The 
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labor market is a space where one’s effort and achievement are rewarded. Thus the way 
the U.S. labor market treats workers of color is informative to understanding the real 
nature of the “open” society. As the “formal” citizenship (as opposed to “practical” 
citizenship) was allowed to racial minorities starting from 1940s,35 exclusionary 
institutions became subtle and “seemed” color-blind (Bonilla-Silva 2006; Collins 2010).  
However, the outcomes have been distinctive by color line. Ample evidence of racial 
inequality has been found in the labor market, such as differentials in earnings by race 
and labor-market segmentation (Glenn 2002).36  
Exclusions of Asians are relatively less known when compared to blacks and 
Hispanics. Asians are often portrayed as a successful minority called a ‘model 
minority’(Abelmann and Lie 1995; Chou and Feagin 2008; Wu 2003). It is often reported 
that Asian Americans have greater-than-average educational attainment, relatively higher 
rates of professional occupations, and higher mean and median incomes (Waters and 
Eschbach 1995; Sakamoto, Goyette, and Kim 2009).  The seemingly successful labor-
market outcomes of the ‘model minority’ or ‘honorary white’ is considered by advocates 
of ‘declining significance of race’ thesis to depict that Asian Americans do not suffer 
                                                     
35 Chinese immigrants gained access to naturalization in 1943, Filipinos and Asian 
Indians in 1946. All restrictions to American citizenship based on race or national origin 
were abolished by the 1953 McCarran Walter Act (Bloemraad 2006:21). 
 
36 Glenn explains mechanism differentiating wages on the basis of ascription with notions 
of a “men’s wage” and a “women’s wage.” According to Glenn (2002:82), “a “men’s 
age” was sufficient to support a worker and family at a decent standard and was a badge 
of honor. A “women’s wage,” in contrast, was calculated even by reformers at a very low 
level and was a mark of dishonor. Women were simply paid less for doing the same kind 
of work or for a given level of productivity than men were.” This conceptual distinction 
has not only gender meaning but race meaning. It may be reasonable to think that a men’s 
wage is more likely to be assigned to white men, and a women’s wage is given to others 




racial/ethnic disadvantages in the labor market (Sakamoto, Wu, and Tzeng 2000; Massey 
2007:113).37 Moreover, their success is suggested as rosy evidence of an eventual 
assimilation of non-whites and whites (Alba and Nee 2003), the condition as inclusive 
and universal in that achievement is universally a determining factor while ascription 
such as race and ethnicity has no significant effect (or declining effect) in one’s labor-
market position. However, the other group of scholars disagrees with the ‘declining 
significance of race,’ pointing lower returns to educational attainment for Asian 
Americans compared to that of whites (Hirschman and Wong 1984; Min 1995). For 
them, the racial disadvantages facing Asian Americans are not declining, rather veiled by 
Asians’ over-education.  
Relatively higher rates of professional occupations among Asian Americans are 
also considered as a sign of successful labor-market assimilation dismantling race effects, 
by the advocates of ‘declining significance of race’ (Alba and Nee 2003). For others, 
however, the simply aggregated information of higher percent of professionals is not 
enough to claim the disappearance of race effects for Asian Americans. They point out 
that some fields are favorable for Asian Americans but not all. This, in turn, is largely 
shaped by the demand for Asian labor with relevant skills in the U.S. labor market.     
According to Ong, Bonacich, and Cheng (1994), Asians’ labor-market 
segregation has been driven by the economic restructuring of the U.S. economy that was 
initiated in the mid-1960s. The economic restructuring needed a larger, highly-trained 
                                                     
37 Massey also demonstrates that the U.S. stratification system is category-based. 
However, he does not think that every racial minority faces the same degree of racial 
disadvantages. The racial disadvantages are more the case of Latinos and blacks while it 
has mattered less for Asian Americans, as he says,  “the future of America would seem to 
be one in which various European and Asian ancestries are increasingly jumbled together 
in a way that makes categorical distinctions between them fade.”(Massey 2007:113) 
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labor force. However, domestic populations within the United States could not meet the 
emerging demands for high-skilled labor in areas such as healthcare, engineering, and 
science. The U.S. government attempted to remediate these labor shortages by importing 
Asian immigrants with the desired high-skills qualifications. Creating an official policy to 
support this goal, the U.S. immigration Act of 1965 gave preference to individuals with 
the desired training and to those with capital to invest. Given its preference, Asians in 
STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) fields and healthcare were perhaps 
less likely to be considered as competitors for native white workers; thus they might 
likely be accepted as labor force that compensated for labor shortages in those fields.  
Lee (2010)’s study found considerable segregation by subfields within 
professional occupations between Chinese/Japanese Americans and non-Hispanic whites. 
Asian’s concentration into particular areas such as science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM) is driven by different rewards given to Asian Americans by areas. 
That is, Asian Americans receive better returns to their education in STEM areas, but do 
not in others. Similarly, Barringer, Takeuchi, and Xenos (1990) found that when other 
factors were controlled, “whites earned more than Asian Americans in almost all 
occupational categories except in the professions, where Asian Americans had much 
higher incomes, but even there they bested whites only among the self-employed.” In the 
discussion, we can find labor-market segmentation between Asians and whites and 
different reward system in each segment, which makes STEM fields and/or self-
employment better choices for Asian American workers to minimize their racial 
disadvantages (or maximize racial advantages). Based on these findings, Lee (2010) 
argues that, for Asian Americans, race operates in choosing the type of occupations, 
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through different rewards by occupation given to Asians. Asian’s greater-than-average 
income on the basis of aggregate information may be due to their disproportionate 
presence in professional occupations, rather than to declining racial/ethnic effects.  
Why and how has the U.S. labor system maintained inequality in earnings and 
segmentation despite a theoretically free labor system? Glenn (2002:85) views this as 
“efforts to shore up the position of wage-earning (white) men” through “excluding 
(women and) men of color as competitors.” According to her, the labor market 
segregation by race and gender was an outcome of such efforts to legitimate the 
protection of native white male workers from competition. As a result, white male 
workers are overrepresented “in capital intensive and more monopolistic sectors and 
industries where higher labor costs could be borne” (Glenn 2002:81). They also are 
disproportionately employed in leadership or supervisory positions (Woo 2000). In 
contrast, as Glenn (2002:81) points out, “minorities, immigrants, and women, lacking 
political or other means to advance their position, were more often relegated to sectors, 
industries, and jobs that were labor intensive, unstable, and highly competitive (where 
downward pressure on wage is greatest).” 
 This chapter aims to understand stratification of the racial/ethnic minority, 
especially focusing on different processes in determining earnings from the labor market. 
For doing this, first, I examine how income (wage and salary income, particularly) 
inequality trends are different by race and what criteria are more responsible in each 
race’s income inequality. Second, I investigate what are more important criteria for social 
selection among racial minority population and how it is different from the stratification 
within the majority whites. 
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5.2. Between- and Within-race Wage Inequality 
This section investigates income inequality among minorities to see whether there 
are unique patterns in the inequality of the U.S. racial/ethnic minorities that are different 
from the one of the white majority. I use the 1% Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 
of years of 1980, 1990, and 2000, and the American Community Survey (ACS) of 2010 
(Ruggles et al. 2010). For this analysis, I use the samples that have any positive wage in 
the survey year. 
Racial gaps in wages have increased from 1980 to 2010. As figure 5.1 illustrates, 
the gap in annual wage and salary income started from about $3,000 in 1980 to $15,000 
in 2010 between the highest (Asians) and the lowest groups (Hispanics). The wage 
growth was more rapid among Asians and Whites than blacks and Hispanics. The median 
wage of Korean Americans was higher than whites until 2000, but is the same as of 2010. 
The trend shows that the growth of Koreans’ median wage has been slower than that of 
whites since 1990. The mean wage trend displays two clusters of mean wages, one is 
among whites and Asians including Koreans, the other is between blacks and Hispanics. 
That is, there is a growing convergence among the former groups, and a growing 
divergence between the former and the latter groups.  
Does this mean that all Asians enjoy parity with whites in wages? Given the fact 
that the gap between two clusters is larger in the mean wages than in median wages, it is 
inferred that Asians’ higher wages (compared to the wages of the other races) are more 
affected by the wages of the high-earning group of Asian populations. If it is true, then 
within-Asian (and within-Korean) wage inequality would be higher than that of the other 




Sources: 1% PUMS for 1980, 1990, 2000, and ACS for 2010 
Notes: White, Black, and Asian samples are non-Hispanics only. 
           Asian samples include Korean samples.  
          All samples are those who have positive wages  
 
 
Sources: 1% PUMS for 1980, 1990, 2000, and ACS for 2010 
Notes: White, Black, and Asian samples are non-Hispanics only. 
           Asian samples include Korean samples.  

























Figure 5.2. The Trends of Mean Wage by Race in the 


























I examine within-race inequalities. I calculate and compare the Gini coefficient of 
wage and salary income of each race group. If the U.S. labor market lowers the wage of 
all minorities regardless of class background, their mean and median wage would be 
lower than that of the majority whites and their Gini coefficients would also be lower 
than that of whites. If the U.S. labor market practices selective exclusion to minorities, 
the Gini coefficient within each minority group would be higher than the Gini coefficient 
within-whites.  
The results demonstrate that Korean Americans’ wage inequality has been highest 
among racial groups included in comparisons. The Gini coefficients of Asians and 
whites, which are similar to that of the national Gini coefficient, take the second highest. 
Blacks and Hispanics are found in the layer of relatively lower inequality. The wage 
inequality pattern has constantly increased from 1980 to 2010 for the four major racial 
groups, and the increase was more rapid among whites and Asians than Blacks and 
Hispanics.  The wage inequality among Korean Americans has always been higher than 
the other race groups. While the rising trend continued throughout the last four decades in 
the four major racial groups, within the Korean community the wage inequality pattern 
had increased between 1980 and 1990 and has remained almost the same from 1990 to 
2010.   
Table 5.1. Gini Index of Wage by Race in the U.S., 1980-2010 
  White Asian  Hispanic Black Korean 
1980  0.458 0.453  0.435 0.437 0.480 
1990  0.473 0.479  0.448 0.443 0.513 
2000  0.484 0.491  0.450 0.450 0.510 
2010  0.501 0.498  0.459 0.466 0.513 
Note: samples are those who have positive wage. The numbers are weighted.  
Source: 1% PUMS for 1980, 1990, 2000, and ACS for 2010 
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 A Gini coefficient measure provides a picture of overall inequality of each group, 
but it does not tell us whose income has changed more. Was it the groups at the extreme 
(both at the highest and lowest) or the middle-income groups that experienced the 
upgrade/downgrade of their income level? This can be answered by wage ratio. The 
P90/P10 ratio indicates changes in the income share of two extreme groups. As of 2010, 
among major racial groups, whites are the highest in this ratio. White workers at the 90th 
percentile of white-wage earn 22.5 times higher than the wage of those at the 10th 
percentile. This ratio is slightly higher than the ratios of blacks and Asians and 
considerably higher than that of Hispanics. Interestingly, the P90/P10 ratio of Korean 
Americans is much higher than that of Asian Americans in general and even higher than 
that of whites. In other words, wage disparity has been enlarged between the richest and 
poorest deciles among Korean Americans.  
Is this high ratio of Korean Americans due to the greater gain of the rich or due to 
the smaller gain of the poor? Comparing the P90/P50 ratios with P50/P10 ratios from 
2000 to 2010, we find that the P90/P50 ratio has increased, while the P50/P10 has not. It 
suggests a greater change in wages among the rich half of the Korean workers, rather 
than to the underperformance of the bottom 10 percent (P10): It can be because of a 
greater gain of the top 10 percent (P90) or be a fall of the wage in the middle (P50) or the 
both.  
The other racial groups exhibit different patterns. All the groups except for 
Hispanics present a significant increase in wage inequality among the poor half for the 
last decade. It implies that there has been the relative underperformance of the bottom ten 
percent for whites, blacks, and Asians. The rich half of whites and Hispanics found a 
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rising wage inequality since 2000, but this is not the case for black and Asian- rich 
populations. It suggests that blacks and Asians have experienced the relative upgrading of 
middle-wage groups, while whites and Hispanics have seen the better performance of 
top-wage groups compared to the middle-wage ones during the last decade.  
 The higher wage inequality and the more rapid growth of the high-wage groups of 
Koreans seem to support the selective inclusion/exclusion thesis. How do their human 
capital and categorical status (including the match between categorical status and the 
roles in the labor market) play in the inclusion or exclusion of Koreans in the U.S. labor 
market? The following section deals with this inquiry.  
 
5.3. Earning Determinants by Category 
Data and Methods 
This section investigates the social mobility mechanisms facing the minority 
populations. I particularly examine the effects of categorical characteristics and human 
capital on earnings among Korean Americans on income,38 and I compare with those of 
native-born white workers, using 2010 ACS data. The samples used are those who have 
positive earnings among metropolitan residents aged 25-64.  For these analyses, I use 
ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis. In this analysis, human capital 
consists of education and English proficiency.39 Educational attainment is recoded into 
                                                     
38 I use earning income instead of wage income to include the self-employed that 
predominate among Korean Americans.  
 
39 Work experience is often counted as human capital. PUMS and ACS have no 
information on work experience. Some scholars create this variable with years after 
completion of their education with the assumption that samples started work right after 
the graduation. The variable generated in this way is likely to correlate with the age 
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five levels (less than high school, high school graduate, some college, a bachelor’s 
degree, and post-bachelor’s degree). In the analyses, high school graduate is omitted as 
the reference group. English proficiency is measured in five levels (“Does not speak 
English,” “Yes, but not well,” “Yes, speaks well,” “Yes, speaks very well,” and “Yes, 
speaks only English”). I treat English proficiency as an ordinary variable from 1 (does 
not speak English) to 5 (Yes, speaks only English).  For categorical characteristics, race, 
gender, age, nativity, citizenship, and class status 40 are included. Regarding the role of 
occupations in the earnings of Korean Americans (as an indicator of the existence of 
selective exclusion), the model also considers the earning effects of working in STEM 
fields (see Appendix A for detailed occupations included in STEM fields) and of self-
employment. Finally, I include in the models some contextual factors (i.e., the median 
earnings of metropolitan areas and percent of co-ethnic population of county where they 
reside). I anticipate that the categorically minority status plays a more significant role in 
shaping the earnings of Korean Americans, while the role of human capital is less 




                                                                                                                                                              
variable. Thus if we put years after graduation (for work experience) as an independent 
variable together with the age variable, it would violate the assumption of independence 
among independent variables. For this reason, I omit work experience from human 
capital. Instead, age would possibly provide some sense of the role of work experience, in 
such limitation. 
 
40   Class status is created as a dichotomous variable, whether in the middle class or not. I 
define the middle-class as those who are college graduates and have a managerial or 




Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics on earnings and the levels of education of 
the U.S. population in general, non-Hispanic whites, and Korean Americans. The mean 
value of total earned income is $52,174, which is significantly higher than that of the 
U.S. general population ($48,225) but lower than that of non-Hispanic whites ($54,438). 
Koreans have a higher level of educational attainment than that of the U.S. general 
population, and even higher than that of non-Hispanic whites. About 58 percent of 
Korean Americans have a bachelor’s degree or higher, while about 32 percent of the 
general population and about 39 percent of whites have the same level of education. 
Korean Americans on average have a significantly lower level of English proficiency 
than the other two groups. This is mainly due to the Korean community’s higher 
proportion of the first-generation immigrants. Among the samples (aged 25-64 who live 
in metropolitan areas), 62 percent are first generation (defined as those who were foreign-
born and immigrated to the U.S. at 18 years old or older) in the Korean community. This 
is noticeably high given that the percent of the first is 16 percent among the U.S. general 
population and only 4 percent among whites. By contrast, in the Korean community, only 
11 percent are second generation or older (i.e., the U.S.-born generation). Among 
Koreans, About 89 percent are foreign-born, and about 62 percent of them are naturalized 
citizens.  
Koreans present two distinctive patterns in occupational distribution. First, 
Koreans are more likely to work in science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM) field. One in five workers work in STEM field that takes only 5 percent of the 
U.S. general workers. The second is that they are more likely to choose self-employment. 
About 21 percent of Koreans are self-employed, which is more than twice as high as the 
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self-employment rate (9.8%) of the U.S. in general.  Koreans live more affluent 
metropolitan areas. The average of the median earned incomes of metropolitan areas 
where Koreans ($34,334) live is higher than that of metropolitan areas where the U.S. 
general population ($31,950) and non-Hispanic whites ($31,722) live. 
 
 
Table 5.2. Descriptive Statistics for Sample by Race, 2010 
  US general   White   Korean T-test 
  Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD  (W/K) 
Earning 48,255 549,328  54,438 587,923  52,174 620,697 ** 
Log earning 10.322 11.404  10.446 11.144  10.380 12.148 *** 
     less than HS 0.123 3.410  0.058 2.346  0.043 2.159 *** 
     High school 0.250 4.486  0.243 4.301  0.166 3.966 *** 
     Some college 0.301 4.753  0.314 4.657  0.214 4.372 *** 
     Bachelor's degree 0.208 4.209  0.245 4.313  0.377 5.166 *** 
     Post Bachelor's degree 0.118 3.348  0.140 3.484  0.200 4.263 *** 
  English proficiency 4.536 9.815  4.903 4.094  3.434 11.768 *** 
  Sex (Male) 0.490 5.182  0.497 5.016  0.421 5.263 *** 
  Age 43.8 116.4  45.1 113.1  42.3 116.3 *** 
  Nativity (Foreign-born) 0.221 4.301  0.066 2.494  0.886 3.390 *** 
  Citizen (US-citizen) 0.881 3.360  0.974 1.593  0.622 5.163 *** 
  1st Generation 0.157 3.771  0.043 2.035  0.629 5.150 *** 
  1.5 Generation 0.063 2.510  0.023 1.508  0.256 4.650 *** 
  2nd Generation and beyond 0.772 4.348  0.933 2.502  0.114 3.388 *** 
  Married 0.242 4.442  0.244 4.307  0.251 4.623  
  Middle class+ 0.035 1.907  0.044 2.066  0.050 2.325 * 
  STEM 0.050 2.269  0.056 2.309  0.062 2.571 * 
  Self-employment 0.098 3.081  0.109 3.121  0.206 4.279 *** 
  Median earning of metro 31,950 55,794   31,722 51,480   34,334 61,457 *** 
  Total N 1,179,399  767,221 7,163  
Notes: The samples are those aged 25-64 and metropolitan residents only  
    The values are weighted by person. 
  +Middle class refers to those who have managerial or professional occupations and have a bachelor's degree 
at least  






Korean Americans and whites 
Table 5.3 compares the effects of each variable on earnings between whites and 
Korean Americans.  Model 1 that includes only human capital indicates that the role of 
education on earnings is higher among whites than among Korean Americans. The 
relative weight of a bachelor’s degree to a high school degree is .567 for whites, while it 
is .346 for Korean Americans. English proficiency does not account much of earning 
differences for whites, but it plays a considerable role among Korean Americans. In 
Model 2 where categorical, occupational, and regional characteristics are taken into 
consideration, the positive effects of a bachelor’s degree and a post-bachelor’s degree is 
still significant and higher for the majority whites than those for Korean Americans. The 
middle-class effect is larger for whites than Korean Americans. 
However, the earning benefit of working in STEM is a little larger for Korean 
Americans than for whites. Self-employment is associated negatively with earnings for 
both groups, but the degree is not similar. The earning disadvantage of self-employment 
is much larger for whites than for Korean Americans. These results are in harmony with 
the higher likelihood of working in STEM fields and self-employment among Korean 
Americans. 41 
Regional characteristics (characterized by two variables: the median income of 
the metropolitan area of residence and the percent of Korean population in the county of 
residence) do not explain much about the earning differences between whites and Korean 
Americans.   
                                                     
41 It may be inferred that Korean Americans enter STEM fields and self-employment 
more than whites because the benefits of STEM are (slightly) greater and the 




Table 5.3. OLS Regression  Estimates of Log Earnings by Race 
  White   Korean 
  Model1 Model2  Model1 Model2 
  b SE B  b SE B   b SE B  b SE B   
Intercept 9.772 0.017 0.000 *** 6.126 0.033 0.000 ***  9.632 0.056 0.000 *** 5.805 0.276 0.000 *** 
     less than HS -0.349 0.007 -0.062 *** -0.340 0.007 -0.060 ***  -0.310 0.093 -0.047 *** -0.295 0.090 -0.045 ** 
     Some college 0.176 0.004 0.074 *** 0.200 0.004 0.084 ***  0.093 0.051 0.034  0.061 0.050 0.022  
     Bachelor's degree 0.567 0.004 0.225 *** 0.507 0.004 0.201 ***  0.346 0.047 0.146 *** 0.234 0.047 0.099 *** 
     Post Bachelor's degree 0.902 0.004 0.295 *** 0.809 0.004 0.265 ***  0.705 0.052 0.255 *** 0.544 0.052 0.197 *** 
  English proficiency 0.070 0.004 0.024 *** 0.090 0.004 0.031 ***  0.128 0.015 0.122 *** 0.136 0.018 0.130 *** 
  Male     0.462 0.003 0.207 ***      0.255 0.030 0.112 *** 
  Age     0.112 0.001 1.108 ***      0.135 0.012 1.257 *** 
  Age-square     -0.001 0.000 -1.009 ***      -0.001 0.000 -1.127 *** 
  Citizen (US-citizen)     0.114 0.011 0.016 ***      0.166 0.038 0.068 *** 
  1st Generation     0.048 0.010 0.008 ***      -0.147 0.059 -0.064  
  1.5 Generation     0.114 0.011 0.012 ***      0.013 0.049 0.005  
  Married     -0.011 0.003 -0.004 ***      -0.014 0.034 -0.005  
  Middle class     0.450 0.006 0.090 ***      0.394 0.062 0.084 *** 
  STEM     0.320 0.005 0.071 ***      0.409 0.056 0.097 *** 
  Self-employment     -0.344 0.004 -0.097 ***      -0.116 0.038 -0.041 ** 
  Median earning of metro     0.000 0.000 0.093 ***      0.000 0.000 0.083 *** 
  Percent of Koreans in 
county     5.001 0.257 0.023 ***      6.959 1.964 0.048 *** 
                  
R-square 0.095       0.198         0.085       0.162       
Notes: Samples are metropolitan residents aged 25-64. The values are weighted by person. 
           *p < .05    **p < .01   ***p < .001 
Source of data: ACS 2010 
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Meanwhile, there are some interesting differences between the two groups in the 
role of each variable relative to that of other variables. According to standardized 
coefficients (Beta) in Model 2, two higher educational degrees (post-bachelor and 
bachelor’s degrees) and gender (being a male worker) play the largest role in their 
earnings among the majority whites.42  
For Korean Americans, the relative weights of explanatory variables seem to be 
different. English proficiency is one of the most important determinants in their earnings. 
It is more important than a bachelor’s degree and even than gender status. Some other 
interesting differences between the two groups are related to the roles of class and STEM. 
Class status matters more than STEM status for whites, while it is the reverse for Korean 
Americans. 
 
Men and Women 
 Table 5.4 separates men and women and displays the effects of independent 
variables in each group. White male workers gain more earning returns to the higher 
education than the Korean male workers in both a bachelor’s and post-bachelor’s degree 
levels. The role of citizenship status is substantial for Korean men, while it is significant 
but not substantial for white men. First-generation Korean men are significantly 
disadvantaged in earnings, while the same generation of white men enjoys a slight 
earning advantage when compared with the U.S.-born generation counterparts. The both 
groups find earning advantages in STEM fields but the degree is much greater among 
Korean men. On the contrary, the disadvantage of self-employment is a very small for 
                                                     
42  Age shows the highest and positive value of Beta, but the effect of age is almost offset 
by the negative beta value for age-square. 
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Korean men, but it is substantial for white men. The class effect (whether middle-class or 
not) appears to be very similar for both white men and Korean men. Regarding regional 
characteristics, the median income of each one’s metropolitan area does not make 
differences in the earnings in both groups.43 Korean concentration in the county, 
interestingly, is more highly associated with the earnings of white men than those of 
Korean men.   
Comparisons of the male samples’ Beta (B) values (indicating the relative 
importance of each variable compared with others) present the higher education is 
outstandingly important than the other variables among white men, but its role is not 
remarkably different from that of the other variables among Korean men.  The most 
noticeable among Korean male workers is the considerable role of STEM in their 
earnings. For Korean men, the earning difference by STEM status is as large as the 
difference by whether having a bachelor’s degree or a high school degree. The relative 
importance of STEM is, by contrast, far modest among white men. Another significant 
difference between white men and Korean men is found in the effect of the first 
generation relative to the second generation or beyond.  The degree (b) and importance 
(Beta) of the first-generation status on earnings is not substantial for white men, while it 
is substantially and negatively associated with the earnings of Korean men. Citizenship 
status also more matters for Korean men, but it is associated positively.  For white men, 
self-employment is more (negatively) important than the other categorical status such as  
 
                                                     
43  This may be because only metropolitan samples are used for this analysis. It also 




Table 5.4. OLS Regression Estimates of Log Earnings, By Sex 
  White   Korean 
 Male Female  Male Female 
  b SE B   b SE B     b SE B   b SE B   
Intercept 5.800 0.043 0.000 *** 7.008 0.050 0.000 ***  5.243 0.374 0.000 *** 6.504 0.402 0.000 *** 
     less than HS -0.310 0.008 -0.062 *** -0.393 0.012 -0.061 ***  -0.549 0.147 -0.073 *** -0.163 0.116 -0.028  
     Some college 0.202 0.005 0.086 *** 0.197 0.005 0.084 ***  0.070 0.071 0.027  0.033 0.070 0.011  
     Bachelor's degree 0.549 0.005 0.224 *** 0.461 0.006 0.184 ***  0.282 0.066 0.127 *** 0.151 0.066 0.062 * 
     Post Bachelor's degree 0.843 0.006 0.280 *** 0.768 0.006 0.257 ***  0.508 0.071 0.206 *** 0.538 0.076 0.178 *** 
  English proficiency 0.100 0.006 0.037 *** 0.075 0.007 0.025 ***  0.121 0.026 0.118 *** 0.151 0.026 0.143 *** 
  Age 0.145 0.001 1.481 *** 0.075 0.001 0.756 ***  0.187 0.016 1.830 *** 0.092 0.017 0.832 *** 
  Age-square -0.002 0.000 -1.363 *** -0.001 0.000 -0.676 ***  -0.002 0.000 -1.668 *** -0.001 0.000 -0.731 *** 
  Citizen (US-citizen) 0.086 0.015 0.013 *** 0.146 0.018 0.019 ***  0.159 0.051 0.071 ** 0.181 0.057 0.070 ** 
  1st Generation 0.075 0.013 0.014 *** 0.009 0.015 0.001   -0.206 0.082 -0.095 * -0.085 0.085 -0.036  
  1.5 Generation 0.098 0.015 0.011 *** 0.131 0.017 0.014 ***  -0.064 0.067 -0.027  0.087 0.072 0.033  
  Married -0.011 0.004 -0.004 ** -0.012 0.004 -0.005 **  -0.018 0.047 -0.007  -0.012 0.048 -0.004  
  Middle class 0.393 0.007 0.088 *** 0.516 0.010 0.093 ***  0.316 0.074 0.082 *** 0.536 0.106 0.093 *** 
  STEM 0.271 0.006 0.075 *** 0.470 0.011 0.075 ***  0.411 0.064 0.123 *** 0.423 0.106 0.073 *** 
  Self-employment -0.242 0.005 -0.077 *** -0.529 0.007 -0.131 ***  -0.054 0.050 -0.021  -0.188 0.058 -0.061 ** 
  Median earning of metro 0.000 0.000 0.099 *** 0.000 0.000 0.090 ***  0.000 0.000 0.064 *** 0.000 0.000 0.097 *** 
  Percent of Koreans in county 4.152 0.342 0.020 *** 5.951 0.386 0.027 ***  0.902 2.623 0.007  12.768 2.915 0.083 *** 
Total N          317,969   292,515        2,460        2,716    
R-square 0.199       0.138         0.184       0.129       
Notes: Samples are metropolitan residents aged 25-64. The values are weighted by person. 
           *p < .05    **p < .01   ***p < .001 




citizenship and generation status, while it is less important than such categorical status for 
Korean men.  
For female workers, the role of the higher education is also significant, but its 
degree is generally smaller than that of male workers. Interestingly, however, Korean 
women who have a post-bachelor’s degree receive higher earnings compared with the 
Korean men. By contrast, the role of a bachelor’s degree (as the highest degree) is 
considerably smaller for Korean women than that of Korean men. It is also much smaller 
when compared with that of white women. English proficiency plays a greater role 
among Korean women than among white women.  
First-generation Korean women face earning disadvantages from the generation 
status, but the disadvantage is minimal when compared with that facing the male 
counterparts. Class effect (managerial and professional occupations of the college-
educated female workers) is greater for women than for men in both whites and Korean 
Americans.  
The STEM effect for Korean women is very similar to that for Korean men. 
Interestingly, white women, compared to white men, find a higher earning advantage in 
STEM fields, which appears to be a very similar to the effect of STEM among Koreans 
both men and women. The disadvantage of self-employment is significant and greater for 
women than for men in both whites and Korean Americans. Regarding regional 
characteristics, Korean women’s earning is highly positively associated with the rate of 
the co-ethnic presence in their county.  
 Table 5.4 shows that Korean women do not gain the similar level of the earning 
returns to their bachelor’s degree, and its significance (indicated by Beta) is small 
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compared to the roles of the other main variables such as English proficiency, citizen 
status, class, STEM, and the percent of the co-ethnic population. Another noticeable 
difference is that the earning advantage of managerial and professional occupations is 
greater than the advantage of STEM fields for Korean women, which was the reverse for 
Korean men.  
 
STEM versus Non-STEM 
 In the U.S. labor market, STEM fields are disproportionately overrepresented by 
Asian Americans. Table 5.5 shows how the factors determining earnings in STEM fields 
are different from those in non-STEM fields for both whites and Korean Americans. It 
also presents the results for Asian Americans to see whether Korean Americans represent 
Asian Americans in general or more unique (due in part to the higher rate of self-
employment).  
STEM fields do not provide a higher earning return to the higher education for the 
majority whites. In fact, the earning contribution of a bachelor’s degree and a post-
bachelor’s degree appear lower in STEM than in non-STEM fields. For Korean 
Americans, the coefficients of both degrees are higher in STEM than in non-STEM 
fields, but they are not statistically significant. In non-STEM fields, the roles of college 
and post-college educational degrees are significant. However, the contribution of the 
education to earnings is considerably lower among non-STEM Korean workers when 
compared with that among whites in both STEM and non-STEM fields.  
As the coefficients of many variables are not significant for Koreans in STEM 






         Notes: Samples are metropolitan residents aged 25-64. The values are weighted by person. 
                      *p < .05    **p < .01   ***p < .001 
           Source of data: ACS 2010 
 
Table 5.6.  OLS Regression Estimates of Log Earnings, By STEM  
  White   Korean  Asian 
 STEM Non-STEM  STEM Non-STEM  STEM Non-STEM 
  b SE   b SE     b SE   b SE    b SE   b SE   
Intercept 6.729 0.093 *** 6.031 0.035 ***  6.889 0.791 *** 5.739 0.296 ***  6.487 0.152 *** 6.056 0.083 *** 
  Less than high school -0.253 0.056 *** -0.339 0.007 ***  -0.184 0.941  -0.292 0.093 **  -0.004 0.117  -0.128 0.017 *** 
  Some college 0.114 0.016 *** 0.200 0.004 ***  0.132 0.265  0.054 0.052   0.201 0.069 ** 0.125 0.015 *** 
  Bachelor's degree 0.400 0.015 *** 0.567 0.004 ***  0.360 0.240  0.268 0.048 ***  0.530 0.065 *** 0.458 0.014 *** 
  Post-bachelor's degree 0.509 0.016 *** 0.889 0.004 ***  0.438 0.242  0.583 0.055 ***  0.624 0.065 *** 0.890 0.015 *** 
  English proficiency 0.099 0.012 *** 0.092 0.005 ***  0.043 0.053  0.144 0.019 ***  0.111 0.011 *** 0.134 0.006 *** 
  Male 0.271 0.008 *** 0.483 0.003 ***  0.247 0.084 ** 0.272 0.032 ***  0.199 0.015 *** 0.283 0.009 *** 
  Age 0.113 0.003 *** 0.114 0.001 ***  0.113 0.034 ** 0.137 0.013 ***  0.121 0.006 *** 0.120 0.004 *** 
  Age-square -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 ***  -0.001 0.000 * -0.001 0.000 ***  -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** 
  Citizen (US-citizen) 0.071 0.026 ** 0.114 0.012 ***  0.162 0.109  0.159 0.041 ***  0.133 0.018 *** 0.250 0.011 *** 
  1st Generation 0.078 0.023 *** 0.052 0.011 ***  -0.286 0.148  -0.146 0.064 *  0.152 0.027 *** -0.006 0.015  
  1.5 Generation 0.096 0.029 *** 0.121 0.012 ***  -0.163 0.110 * 0.018 0.053   0.091 0.027 *** 0.108 0.015 *** 
  Married 0.013 0.008  -0.013 0.003 ***  -0.177 0.087  -0.007 0.036   0.007 0.016  -0.009 0.010  
  Self-employment -0.599 0.017 *** -0.347 0.004 ***  -0.366 0.210  -0.101 0.040 **  -0.384 0.047 *** -0.238 0.014 *** 
  Median earning of metro 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 ***  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 ***  0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 
  Percent of Koreans in county 4.297 0.717 *** 5.120 0.272 ***  8.834 5.164  7.242 2.098 ***  4.533 1.072 *** 3.832 0.615 *** 
                     
N 44,469     722,752     
     
431    
  
4,745     9,546   49,770   
R-square 0.174     0.173       0.225     0.134      0.162     0.200     
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better understanding on how the roles of STEM fields might be different between whites 
and Asian Americans. Unlike whites, Asian Americans in general do a better job in 
STEM than in non-STEM fields in actualization of their bachelor’s degrees into earning  
return. In STEM fields, Asian’s earning returns to the college education are even higher 
than those of whites. This result is inferred that STEM fields are better for Asian 
Americans in maximizing the earning effect of their bachelor’s degree. However, STEM 
fields turn out not advantageous for Asian Americans who have a post-bachelor’s 
degree.44   
The role of gender is interesting. For whites, STEM fields are relatively gender-
neutral (albeit male workers are still significantly advantaged than their female 
counterparts even in this area) when compared with non-STEM fields. That is, white  
women would be less disadvantaged if they work in STEM fields. The similar pattern is 
found among Asian workers as well (but the gap in the gender effect between STEM and 
non-STEM fields is smaller than that for whites). For Korean workers, gender is not as 
much important as is among the whites and among Asians in both STEM and non-STEM 
fields.   
 
5.4. Conclusions 
 Within Korean Americans, the human capitals (college and post-college 
educations and English proficiency) play a significant role in the level of earnings. 
However, the importance of these human capitals is not as large as that among whites. 
Their categorical status, such as first-generation immigrant or non-citizen status, appears 
                                                     
44 This may be attributed to a high rate of Asian Americans in high-paying professional 
schools such as law schools or medical schools that is not considered as a STEM field. 
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to be important and negatively associated with their earnings, while these categorical 
status are not so much important among whites. Among Korean Americans, the role of 
gender status is interesting. The wage returns to the bachelor’s degree among Korean 
women is smaller than that among Korean men, but their post-bachelor’s degree is better 
transferred to wage returns, compared to men’s. Class status (whether or not having a 
college degree and managerial or professional occupations) affects both whites’ earnings 
and Koreans’ earnings, but the effect is larger among whites than among Koreans.  
What matters more among Koreans in their earnings is the roles they take in the 
labor market. STEM fields are significantly and positively associated with their earnings, 
but among whites, in fact, STEM fields appear to be associated a little bit negatively with 
their earnings. Self-employment, which is relatively very popular among Koreans, is 
negatively associated with earnings for both whites and Koreans. However, the 
disadvantage is much smaller among Koreans compared to that among whites. 
In the beginning of this chapter, I discussed the history of the U.S.’s exclusionary 
institutions against racial minorities. Since the post-war era, the exclusionary systems 
became transformed to be more selective in order to meet changing demand for labor in 
the context of the economic restructuring. The rapid growth of immigrants from Asia was 
a response to this changing demand for high-skilled labor, especially in STEM fields. The 
U.S. immigration policy manifested the selective inclusions/exclusions through explicit 
occupational-preference systems. The STEM preferences are still explicit in the current 
U.S. immigration policy. For example, it is granted to only STEM-majoring international 
students OPT (Optional Practical Training) extension for additional 17 months 
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(Department of Homeland Security 2008).45 The STEM’s wage advantages among 
Koreans and Asians can be understood in such U.S. institutions favored to STEM. This 
may result in the overrepresentation of Asians in STEM fields (Lee 2010). Thus, I argue 
that, for Koreans, their race category plays a role in career choices, and this a responsive 
strategy to the U.S. selective mechanisms.   
  
                                                     
45 See “8 CFR Parts 214 and 274a [DHS No. ICEB-2008-0002; ICE No. 2124-08] RIN 






Chapter 6. Conclusions and Discussion 
Global movement of capital and people is not a new phenomenon and is expected 
to grow in the future. However, our analyses, with a few exceptions, are lagging behind 
the rapidly changing empirical world because of being limited by old-fashioned nation-
bound perspectives. This study has presented an example of how we can understand 
stratification and social mobility in a global perspective. A global perspective perceives 
stratification as a global process. This global perspective pays attention to the position of 
people and their social mobility at a global level. In this global framework, three paths to 
social mobility become visible: within-country mobility, between-country mobility, and 
jumping categorical inequality (or global mobility through international migration).  
How do stratification and social mobility look different from this global 
perspective (with the concept of the three paths to social mobility)? The nation-bound 
modernization perspective understands “the accumulation of human capital as the 
principal path to upward social mobility” and it believes “the relative access to this route 
is more or less shared equally, as ascribed inequality is weakened over time” (Moran 
2012:278). This is a predominating path from a national perspective. At a global level, 
however, the effect of this path looks not so strong as usually assumed. What we can see 
from a global perspective is that the importance of the accumulation of human capital 
(claimed as universal by the modernization school) is more true for the global elite class 
(which is mostly constituted of the categorical majority groups of the rich First World 




In other countries, this first path (accumulation of human capital) is neither the 
most promising path to social mobility nor is its effect as large as it was usually assumed. 
The second path (between-country mobility) instead appears more important than the 
within-country mobility in global social mobility. As explored in chapter 3 (Figure 3.15), 
in South Korea, while earning a college or post-college degree or getting a high-paying 
occupation within the country, makes it possible to upgrade the global position by just 
two deciles (from 8th decile to 10th decile) at most during the 1988-2002 period, and the 
national economic growth moved the nation from one of the “third world” countries in 
1960 to one of the “rich” countries in 2000 (Milanovic 2005:68-68 table 7.1).  The 
mobility of the country through economic growth raised the majority of the population 
from globally lower positions (below the middle) to global upper or middle classes (9th or 
10th deciles).  
Between-country mobility can be quite effective for global social mobility, but it 
is in fact less attractive for individual households. National economic growth is mostly 
beyond the discretion of individual households. Besides, it is not easy to expect that a 
generation experiences such significant upgrading of the country within their time, 
because it may take a century or at least a few decades, even it may possibly never occur 
in many countries. Although South Koreans experienced global upward mobility through 
its rapid economic growth, this case is not a universally common trend among developing 
countries; rather, it is one of a few unique cases in the development literature. Thus, this 




The third path to social mobility – jumping categorical inequality (mainly through 
international migration in this global mobility context) – is another route to global 
upward mobility. This study investigated the case of Korean immigration into the United 
States. Its effect was measured by comparisons of the global income position of Korean 
American income deciles to that of South Korean income deciles between 1998 and 
2002.46. Each Korean American decile group presents its global income standing that is 
significantly higher than the global position of South Korean counterparts of each 
corresponding decile. In 1998, the seven deciles (4th-10th deciles) or about 70 percent of 
Korean Americans were positioned within the world’s richest 10 percent, while only one 
decile (the 10th) or about 10 percent of South Koreans was found in the global top decile. 
In 2002, about 75 percent (or 15 ventile groups) of Korean Americans found themselves 
in the global top decile, while about 20 percent of South Koreans made it. Put differently, 
for South Koreans, the international migration to the United States raises the likelihood of 
achieving the high status (the global richest 10 percent) by seven times in 1998 and by 
3.75 times in 2002.  
The crucial importance of location is also found in worldwide wage gaps. 
Comparisons of wage levels of the major cities of different countries revealed that 
changing location is more effective than upgrading occupation to upward income 
mobility on a global scale. Wage variance is accounted for more by the variance of 
location (across cities of different countries) than by the variance of occupation 
                                                     
46 This comparison gives a more structural picture of the effect of international migration 
on global social mobility because my data is not a longitudinal data tracing pre- and post-
migration income of individual households. It is possible that, at an individual level, there 
might exist many households that experienced downward mobility as opposed to the 
general trend of upward mobility. 
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(Korzeniewicz and Albrecht, unpublished manuscript). Overall, at a global level, the 
social mobility effect of the within-country mobility (through receiving higher education 
and getting a high-paying occupation) looks limited, compared to the effects of the other 
two paths.  
 Chapter 4 examined occupational mobility of Korean Americans before and after 
migration using two regional (Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles) surveys. Then, it, 
using merged individual-level census data of each of two countries, compared the roles of 
human capital of South Koreans and Korean Americans at a broader (global and 
transnational) context; and investigated the relative weight of country (whether living in 
South Korea or in the United States), compared to that of having a college or post-college 
degree.  
 For Korean immigrants, by occupation, downward, rather than upward, mobility 
is more common after migration to the United States. Many Korean immigrants took 
lower-prestige and less-skilled jobs compared to their jobs in the country of origin. 
However, their income is considerably higher than the income of South Koreans 
remaining in South Korea. Placing the incomes of South Koreans and Korean Americans 
together on the transnationally integrated income deciles, this study found that about one 
in four Korean immigrants (KIM) and about one in two children of Korean immigrants 
(KUS) are located in the richest 10 percent, while only one in twenty South Koreans are 
presented in the same decile.  
 A following question of the study was which one, either attaining a college or 
post-college degree or migrating to the United States, is more effective for South Koreans 
to upward income mobility. The study, thus, compared the income effect of the two 
140 
 
mobility practices. Considering the immigrants’ skewed distribution in class background 
(i.e., selectivity), the study controlled for education and some other demographic and 
socioeconomic statuses. The study did additional analyses not only for South Koreans 
(including Korean Americans) in general, but for the higher (the richest quarter) income 
group and for the lower (the poorest quarter) income group separately, given that the 
effects of location and education may differ by income group. The results showed that 
among Koreans, in general, the effect of location is not significantly different from that of 
a college or post-college degree. However, this seems to be a result of the compensating 
effect of two opposing directions of the top quarter and the bottom quarter. In the top 
quarter, the new location is significantly and positively associated with income after 
controlling for education, and its effect is substantially higher than the effect of a college 
or post-college degree. In the bottom quarter, by contrast, the new destination is 
negatively associated with income, all other factors being equal. These results imply that, 
among South Koreans, middle- and upper-class workers are usually better at transferring 
their migration to income benefit than the working-class counterparts. 
 As soon as they arrive at a destination, international migrants become a minority 
in a destination and their social mobility processes are shaped by the stratification system 
of the destination. To grasp a more comprehensive understanding of global stratification, 
it is incorporated into analysis of how minorities are treated in a destination. The majority 
of international migrant workers move from a relatively poorer country to a wealthier 
country, and from a less modernized to more modernized (in the eye of Westerners) 
society. If admitting the modernization perspective, we should find that the migrant 
workers receive higher returns to human capital in a destination compared with the 
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returns in a country of origin because, in their more modern destination, human capital is 
supposed to play an essential role in determining rewards in a labor market.  
 Chapter 5 is about the U.S. stratification system for racial/ethnic minorities. The 
findings suggest that Korean Americans face different processes of being rewarded in the 
labor market, compared to the processes facing whites. For whites, higher education 
(bachelor’s and post-bachelor’s degrees) is a very important factor to upward mobility, as 
assumed by the modernization perspective. However, for Koreans in the United States, 
the role of a bachelor’s degree is much smaller than that of whites. English proficiency 
has almost the same importance as a bachelor’s degree. While first-generation status 
turns out a little positive for whites, but it appears negative among Koreans. STEM fields 
do provide higher earning returns to education for Koreans, but not to whites. White self-
employers, other things being equal, make earnings significantly less than the earnings of 
wage-worker counterparts, while such earning disadvantage of self-employment is not 
considerable among Koreans. The earning disadvantage of the categorical status (being a 
Korean) is larger for men than for women. The earning effect of ethnic economy 
(measured by the percentage of Koreans in the same county) is positive, but not 
substantial among Koreans. Instead, whites receive relatively more earning advantage 
from the concentration of Korean population in a county. 
What are theoretical implications we can draw from these results? The division 
of role (or labor) is assigned along with categorical boundary both at a global level and a 
within-nation level. Further, the roles of human capital such as education and skill vary 
depending on who (categorically defined) works for what (i.e., occupation). These 
processes challenge the traditional methodology employed by the modernization school 
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that treats human capital as an independent factor accounting for social mobility. The 
global stratification perspective, by contrast, views the role of human capital as an 
outcome of broader processes being operated on a global scale. Korzeniewicz and Moran 
(2009:103) underline that “the human capital criteria that underpin inequality are 
themselves an outcome of institutional arrangements linked to Schumpeterian processes 
of creative destruction.” In this global perspective, thus, the definitions of “high” and 
“low” skill (which is viewed by the modernization school as a main human capital 
criterion used to “differentially distribute returns to various populations”) are instead 
understood as a more categorical expression being constructed and kept changing over 
time by institutional arrangements leading the processes of creative destruction.  
Despite the dynamic processes of creative destruction, however, categorical 
inequality in access to resources and opportunity has endured for a long time: the 
economic gap between Third World and First World has endured except for a few cases 
of Asian Tigers at a global level, and racial inequality has persisted for a long time in the 
United States. These “durable” categorical inequalities imply that the processes of 
creative destruction revolve on categorical distinctions, while destructing and creating 
institutional arrangements that shape the distribution of returns to human capital to 
different segments of population. For example, my Pakistani friend introduced in the 
chapter 1 has a master’s degree and competent English skill, but his education and skill 
were not rewarded in the roles that were not tacitly allowed for his categorical 
characteristics in South Korea (e.g., teaching English as a non-white or non-American). 
That is, his categorical characteristics were not qualified for the roles that needed his 
education and skill. He was more wanted by low-skilled 3D (difficult, dangerous, and 
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dirty) industries that would not care what human capital he possessed, but only cared 
about how healthy and strong he was. In America, Asian Americans are stereotyped as 
being good at math and science, but not being good in managerial or leadership positions 
(Chou and Feagin 2008;Wu 2003). The impact of this stereotype is reflected in different 
earning benefits between STEM fields and non-STEM fields for Asian Americans. That 
is, Asian Americans are somewhat less disadvantaged in STEM than in non-STEM fields. 
As a result, Asian Americans are overrepresented in STEM fields, but underrepresented 
in higher-ranked managerial and leadership positions.  
At a global level, there is international division of labor and this institutional 
arrangement accounts for different roles and different returns to skill by country. South 
Korea took a role in labor-intensive light industries in the beginning of its 
industrialization from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. At that time, this manufacturing 
seemed “lucrative” in South Korea, as the country had just been transformed from an 
agricultural to an industrial society and promoted a massive rural-to-urban migration. The 
very same (labor-intensive) manufacturing was simultaneously a declining industry in the 
United States. Facing increasing and expensive labor, the United States started 
restructuring its economy by upgrading its industrial structure and outsourcing 
manufacturing to countries of cheap labor. The U.S. restructuring processes made 
Fordism characterized by a mass production an obsolete system and created post-Fordism. 
Besides, the restructuring replaced the manufacturing industry with a financial one for a 
main source of profit. In these processes, Fordism-based manufacturing jobs were 
recognized as “unskilled” occupations in the U.S. economy. The growth of 
manufacturing in South Korea was closely related to this restructuring in the United 
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States. The U.S. capitals that had sought cheap labor found a cheap, but well-educated, 
labor force in South Korea. From the view of South Korean workers, at that period, the 
manufacturing, albeit it was labor-intensive and low-paid, looked like a new industry that 
resembled Western “modern” societies. As the “modern” manufacturing companies were 
increasingly established, the skills required to this industry were highly valued, while 
agriculture was viewed as a traditional sector where modern high skill was not required. 
Later, when the Korean state transformed its industrial structure to heavy-chemical 
centered from the mid-1970s, labor-intensive light manufacturing was devaluated as a 
less-skilled industry and was handed over to women to maintain and justify the cheap 
wage (Kim 1997), while operators of capital-intensive machines of heavy-chemical 
industry came to be labeled high-skill workers. A world-historical perspective, which 
pays attention to such creative destruction processes shaped by unequal relations between 
nations, as Korzeniewicz and Moran (2009:103) noted, “helps us understand, for example, 
why certain criteria (such as literacy, elementary education, secondary education, or 
computer skills) serve to claim (or justify) higher returns in one period but not later on in 
time; why some jobs are perceived as unskilled in some countries but skilled in others; or 
why new production processes might be read as deskilling in some countries but as 
upgrading in others.”  
It means that the developmental level of a country and its position in the world 
systems constitutes the “high” and “low” skill and shapes its economic return. Thus, for 
individual workers, nationality or where he/she lives is crucial for their earning and social 
mobility. It means that the role of individuals’ achievement is not so a much determining 
factor as assumed in the modernization school. And categorical status is more important 
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than usually assumed. As where people were born is very important at a global level, 
people’s position depends more on the position of their country. However, upgrading the 
global position of a country is hardly expected and beyond the discretion of individual 
households. In this circumstance, moving to a richer country becomes more attractive in 
achieving upward mobility. 
 This study, through the investigation of the case of South Korean social mobility 
at a global level and in a destination context, finds category-based opportunity hoarding 
is a main mechanism of stratification at both global and destination levels. At a global 
level, it is location or nationality that plays a central role in global stratification, and in 
the destination society, it is race/ethnicity that constitutes a main criterion of social 
selection among minorities. The returns to human capital are distributed unevenly 
according to the combination of occupations and categorical characteristics. The 
categorical outsiders can maximize their returns to education only when they do the roles 
that are assigned to their category. Asian Americans receive relatively higher returns to 
their education in STEM fields than when they work in non-STEM fields, unlike the 
majority whites among whom there is no such STEM earning advantages. In non-STEM 
fields, education does not play a role among Asian American workers as much as it does 
among white workers.  
 The findings of this study have theoretical and methodological implications: the 
role of human capital and the role of categorical status should be understood in global 
division of labor (or global labor supply system) and categorical characteristics usually 
play a central role in shaping. The roles of human capital are likely to be determined by 
the categorical status of those who possessed the human capital. Which skill is better to 
146 
 
maximize the returns to the investment in human capital also depends on the categorical 
characteristics such as STEM-related skills for Asian Americans.  
 Methodologically, this study challenges the traditional unit of analysis and its 
assumption. National stratification should not be assumed as single and independent; it 
should be understood in a broader context, global stratification. This shift of framework 
from national to global changes the traditional ways in which we model for stratification 
analysis. That is, this framework shift entails changes our analytic model regarding what 
should be an independent or explanatory variable and what should be a dependent 
variable to be explained. In this vein, Moran (2012:277) notes, “the social attitudes used 
in mainstream social science to “explain” inequality and individual attainment – such as 
education, skill, gender, race and ethnicity, and so forth – become instead the changing 
expression of processes of differentiation that entail both within- and between-country 
inequality”(Moran 2012: 277). This view leads us not to apply a same analytic model to 
every society, but to have more historical and relational perspective on stratification.  
This project, especially chapter 4, is a trial of applying transnational and global 
stratification perspectives to the empirical study of stratification. There are many 
limitations due mainly to the underdevelopment of the transnational methodology, as well 
as lack of available data. First, the regression models are somewhat too simple in that it 
includes educational degrees only for human capital. As two nations’ survey data were 
not standardized, a limited number of variables were successfully integrated. For a better 
understanding of the roles of achieved characteristics on income, work experiences, 
levels of skill, the field of education, and the quality of education should also be 
considered. Variables for ascribed or categorical variables are also very limited. Some 
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ascribed characteristics also should be included such as the socioeconomic status of 
parents if data provide such information. Besides, the models did not account for the role 
of social capital that is increasingly important in stratification research.  Second, chapter 
4 focuses solely on 2007 data. The effects of each income mobility practice can differ 
depending on the different contexts of each period of time. Thus, a historical study on 
changing context is necessary for an understanding of how global stratification works. 
Especially, a historical analysis of international migration policies will shed light on our 
understanding of why middle- and upper-class immigrants enjoy benefits from their 
migration while their working-class counterparts do not. Third, if we had microdata that 
contained information of both pre-migration and post-migration statuses for Koreans, we 
would have been able to more accurately estimate returns to international migration and 
the changing roles of each of the achieved factors and ascribed ones. I hope that such pre- 
and- post-migration microdata will soon be at our disposal in the near future. Last, but 
not least, this study used only income position as an objective indicator of social status 
and social mobility. This may be fine for the purpose of my study, but at the same time, I 
acknowledge that the meaning of social mobility varies for each culture and population. 
Occupational prestige, cultural/social capital, and furthermore symbolic capital, all are 
worthy to be measured as an indicator of social status. Future research should embrace 





Appendix A. Detailed STEM occupations  
 
Computer and math Occupations 
Computer scientists and systems analysts 
(Computer and information research scientists) 
(Information security analysts) 
Computer programmers 
Computer software engineers 
Computer support specialists 
Database administrators 
Network and computer systems administrators 
Network systems and data communications analysts 
Mathematicians 
Operations research analysts 
(Web developers) 
Statisticians 
Miscellaneous mathematical science occupations (including mathematicians and 
statisticians) 
 
Engineering and surveying occupations 






Computer hardware engineers 
Electrical and electronic engineers 
Environmental engineers 
Industrial engineers, including health and safety 
Marine engineers and naval architects 
Materials engineers 
Mechanical engineers 
Mining and geological engineers, including mining safety engineers 
Nuclear engineers 
Petroleum engineers 
Engineers, all other 
Drafters 
Engineering technicians, except drafters 
Surveying and mapping technicians 
Sales engineers 
 
Physical and life sciences occupations 




Conservation scientists and foresters  
Medical scientists 
Astronomers and physicists 
Atmospheric and space scientists 
Chemists and materials scientists 
Environmental scientists and geoscientists 
Physical scientists, all other 
Agricultural and food science technicians 
Biological technicians 
Chemical technicians 
Geological and petroleum technicians 
Nuclear technicians 
Other life, physical and, social science technicians 
 
STEM managerial occupations 
Computer and information systems managers 
Engineering managers 
Natural sciences managers 
 
 
Source: (Beede et al. 2011) 
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